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International Insider Trading: Reassessing the
Propriety and Feasibility of the
U.S. Regulatory Approach
George C. Nnonat
I. Introduction
This article attempts a critique of the U.S. approach to the
regulation of international insider trading. It considers the
appropriateness and feasibility of regulating international insider
trading along the lines and scope sought by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). It notes daunting conceptual and
practical difficulties in that regard, and posits a different approach.
Part II outlines the essential features of the SEC's domestic
and international insider trading regimes, and the common policy
leanings that animate both.' Part III articulates the normative and
practical problems with the SEC's approach, focusing particularly
on the current state of the insider trading debate within the United
States, the character of U.S. insider trading norms in the wider
context of the peculiar activist jurisprudence of the U.S. courts that
shapes such norms, and the impediments to insider trading
regulation as a ban on the use of classes of information in a new
age of heightened information mobility.' Part IV explores
emergent themes in international securities regulation as
applicable to insider trading, concluding that these present a more
auspicious approach to international insider trading regulation, in
the context of globalized and interlocking financial markets that
increasingly constrain national regulation of the sort attempted by
t Graduate Fellow, Harvard Law School. LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1999;
LL.M. Lagos University, 1992; LL.B. (magna cum laude) Ife University, 1988.
Associate, Global Finance & Transactional Practice Group, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, New York. The author's thanks go to Professor Hal Scott for his comments on
earlier drafts of this paper, and to Professors Anne-Marie Slaughter, Phillip Wellons,
Detlev Vagts, and William Alford for their insightful suggestions on aspects of the
article and general encouragement.
I See infra notes 4-86 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 87-216 and accompanying text.
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the SEC.3
II. Contours of the Current Regulatory Regime
A. Background
In many jurisdictions the meaning of the term "insider trading"
may be sought by reference to a statutory provision defining it.4
While such a definition may not be without problems, it provides a
good starting point for analysis and a statutory anchor which
prevents the offense from being in a perpetual state of flux. In the
United States, no such statutory definition exists. The offense has
largely been a product of patchwork judicial development,
concocted principally with Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) as the principal source
of authority.5
Rule 1Ob-5 makes it
unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
3 See infra notes 217-240 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., The Criminal Justice Act, 1993, § 52 (Eng.), a British statute which
defines the offense in the following terms: "An individual who has information as an
insider is guilty of insider dealing if . . . he deals in securities that are price-affected
securities in relation to the information." While this provision was a result of the
European Community (EC) Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30, Britain had prior to
1989 regulated insider trading ("insider dealing" in British parlance) originally in Part V
of the Companies Act 1980, and subsequently consolidated it in the Company Securities
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985.
5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (The Exchange Act). The prohibition against
insider trading in the United States rests primarily upon § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j (2001) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001), promulgated
thereunder.
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security.
This rule was aimed primarily at the common law position
which permitted corporate insiders (as well as outsiders) to
purchase securities from a shareholder, based on "inside"
information not available to such shareholder, since they owed no
duty to the shareholder beyond the standard duty regarding fraud,
as applicable to the purchase or sale of any chattel in the
marketplace.6 It is one in a bag of tools aimed at protecting the
investing public from fraud, to which the securities market has
historically been quite prone, as evident in the chicanery leading to
the restrictions on company promotions and stock transfers in the
English Bubble Act of 1720.7  Adopting a rather creative
approach, the SEC, with the full imprimatur of the courts,
fashioned from this rule an affirmative duty upon insiders to
disclose material non-public information before trading in the
securities to which that information relates.8 As evolved, the duty
clearly has a fraud-fiduciary duty underpinning, so that it is not
enough that the person trading in the securities has material non-
public information at the time of the transaction. In addition, there
must be at least a fiduciary relationship of some sort between the
trader and the issuer of the securities. It is the existence of this
fiduciary relationship that gives rise to the duty to disclose or
abstain from trading.9 For persons who trade on information
6 See L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 747-48
(1995). Loss and Seligman state that,
with §10(b) nonself-operative, the combination of §17(a) of the 1933 Act and
§§9(a)(4), 15(c)(1), and 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act did not cover fraud in the
purchase of securities by persons other than (1) brokers and dealers acting over
the counter or (2) persons buying registered securities for the purpose of
inducing their purchase by others. This was a serious gap because an issuer
itself, or an officer or director or principal stockholder, could buy its securities
by fraudulent practices without being touched ....
See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE 153-54 (1996); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933)
(exemplifying this common law position).
7 6 Geo. I, ch. 18 (Eng.). See 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
192, 214-15 (1972).
8 See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); followed by S.E.C. v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
9 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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tipped by primary insiders (tippees), their duty to disclose or
abstain is derived from the basic fiduciary duties of the insider
(tipper). For such tippees, therefore, a duty to disclose or abstain
is assumed only when the tipper has himself in disclosing the
inside information, breached his fiduciary duties to the issuer, and
the tippee is aware, or ought to be aware, of this fact.1" This
element of awareness is important, as the liability under Rule 1 Ob-
5 requires a mental element-the so-called scienter requirement.
Given the antecedents of Rule lOb-5, the emphasis by the
courts on fiduciary duties and the fraudulent breach of the same is
not surprising, for there is a need to justify the distinction made
between a sale or purchase of any chattel and a sale or purchase of
securities. if inside information could be used to the advantage of
an insider in the former situation, the prohibition of such a use in
the latter situation also had to be justified, and the existence of a
fiduciary relationship in the latter situation was latched upon as
such justification. What is more, the breach of the insider's duty
under such circumstances, to the detriment of the unsuspecting
third party, underscored the apparent fraud and inherent unfairness
of insider trading, these being underlying notions supporting the
prohibition of insider trading.
While it has aided the development of the prohibition against
insider trading, the fiduciary duty-fraud concept has occasionally
turned out to be an albatross around the neck of the SEC and the
courts, especially in the context of their constant desire to reach
whatever securities transaction smacks of unfairness or fraud
(however subjective or broadly defined) under the general rubric
of insider trading. Such was the situation in Chiarella v. United
States.1 Here the defendant, Chiarella, was an employee in the
composing room of a financial printing company retained by the
acquiring corporation in a tender offer for the shares of another
corporation. Notwithstanding efforts to conceal the identity of the
target from the employees of the printer, the defendant by virtue of
his job and ingenuity correctly identified the target and bought its
shares through a broker. He subsequently sold his shares at a
profit, when the tender offer was announced. He was indicted for
violating Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court, reversing the court of
10 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
11 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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appeal, held that Chiarella's conduct was not a violation, because
no fiduciary nexus could be established between Chiarella and the
corporation whose securities he traded. The Court concluded that
the duty to abstain from trading arises from the relationship of
trust between a corporation's shareholders and its employees; such
a relationship was lacking here. 2 As an alternative theory to
support Chiarella's conviction, the government argued that he had
violated a duty to the acquiring corporation by misappropriating
information. The Court, however, declined to consider this
alternative theory, as it was not submitted to the jury.
Under the misappropriation theory, any individual (not
necessarily a corporate insider) may be held criminally liable for
insider trading in violation of Rule 10b-5, not necessarily on the
basis of breach of a fiduciary duty owed the issuer or its
shareholders, but on the ground of his having misappropriated
non-public information from an independent source, in breach of a
duty owed to that source.'3 The cases of Carpenter v. United
States and United States v. O'Hagan explicate this theory.' 4 In
Carpenter, Winans, a reporter for the Wall Street Journal, gave
third parties advance knowledge of the contents of a column of
which he was a co-writer, knowing that the market typically
reacted to the contents of the column due to the column's
perceived integrity. Based on this advanced knowledge, the third
parties traded in stock covered by the column, and split the gains
with Winans. The lower federal courts easily found that Winans
had knowingly breached a duty of confidentiality owed his
employer, the Journal, under his contract of employment, by
misappropriating the prepublication information concerning the
column. The breach of this duty and concealment of the scheme
amounted to a fraud and deceit on the Journal. Even though the
Journal, the victim of this fraud, had no interest in the securities
traded, the fraud was nevertheless considered by these courts to be
connected with a purchase or sale of securities within the meaning
of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court
ultimately left the scope of the theory undecided by splitting four-
12 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
13 KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 6, at 156-58.
14 Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); United States v. O'Hagan, 117
S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
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to-four on the Rule lOb-5 count and affirming the conviction on
other counts. 5 However, in the subsequent O'Hagan case, the
Supreme Court addressed the misappropriation theory directly and
affirmed its validity as a basis for insider trading liability. The
Court recognized that in lieu of basing liability on a fiduciary
relationship between company insider and the purchaser or seller
of the company's stock, liability could be based on a fiduciary-
turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access
to confidential information, even if these were not the persons
with whom the insider had traded. 6
Following difficulties with the misappropriation theory in
Chiarella and subsequent cases, the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-
3,17 pursuant to the provisions of § 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 8 to
deal specifically with insider trading in the context of a tender
offer. The Rule provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to
commence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the "offering
person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e)
of the Act for any other person who is in possession of material
information relating to such tender offer which information he
knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows
or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by
such tender offer, or
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other
person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to
purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such
securities or any securities convertible into or exchangeable for
any such securities or any option or right to obtain or to dispose
of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable
time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its
source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
15 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
16 O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2206.
17 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986).
18 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
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The idea behind this provision was to catch traders like
Chiarella, in the context of tender offers, which are a veritable
spawning ground for insider trading, such trading not being readily
amenable to Rule lOb-5 as interpreted by the courts. This rule has
however not proven to be a complete antidote to insider trading in
the context of a tender offer, as. the courts that have interpreted it
have superimposed limitations thereon. In Camelot Industries v.
Vista Resources19 for instance, the court dismissed an action
against a stockbroker who received inside information about a
planned business acquisition, given that there was no evidence that
he had direct knowledge of the actual tender offer plan. In
O'Hagan, however, the Supreme Court upheld O'Hagan's
conviction for insider trading under Rule 14-e3(a), though the sole
question before the Court was whether the SEC had exceeded its
rulemaking authority under § 14(e) when it adopted Rule 14-
e3(a). °
Apart from Rule 14e-3, insider trading liability under the
federal securities laws21 in the United States also flows from other
provisions effectively subsidiary to the Rule lOb-5 prohibition.
These provisions are: § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,22 § 16b
of the Exchange Act,23 and § 20(a) of the Exchange Act.24
Section 17(a) makes it
[U]nlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities
by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or by the use of the
mails, directly or indirectly-
19 535 F. Supp. 1174, 1182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
20 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
21 The proscription of insider trading in the Blue Sky laws of individual states has
generally been overshadowed by Federal proscription and regulation under various
securities laws. See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 9-11.
22 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
23 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 741-43.
24 The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2001), and the parallel statute
prohibiting fraud by wire, radio, or television communications, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2001),
are also available for use in enjoining insider trading to the extent that it qualifies as
interstate fraud. However, these have largely been overshadowed by the provisions of
the Securities and Exchange Act and the rules made thereunder, starting with § 17(a) of
the Securities Act, which marked an advance over the mail and wire fraud statutes in
several respects, these being specifically tailored to the securities field. See Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 741-43.
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.25
This provision has been described as the grandfather of all the
SEC anti-fraud provisions.26 While it is amenable to restraining
insider trading in the sale of securities by dealers and others who
purchase securities primarily for the purpose of resale, it is
incapable of restraining insider trading in other contexts. This is
not surprising, given that the Securities Act was primarily aimed at
regulating the issue and sale of securities in the primary market,
and was therefore skewed towards those who sold and distributed
securities, rather than those buying beneficially for themselves. It
was on account of this loophole that the SEC in 1942 promulgated
Rule lOb-5 (formerly Rule X-10B-5) under the Exchange Act, by
borrowing the language of § 17(a) and applying it to the purchase
and sale of any securities.
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act obliges officers, directors,
and any person holding more than ten percent of any class of any
equity security of a corporation to pay over to the corporation any
profits made by them within a six-month period from any purchase
and sale, or sale and purchase of the corporation's stock. It is
applied sharply in a near mechanical manner to penalize any pair
of transactions (sale and purchase or vice versa) which occur
within a period of six months. This is a prophylactic rule against
insider trading by this group of insiders, since the aim is to
dissuade such insiders ab initio from making short-swing profits
using inside information available to them solely by virtue of their
relationship with the corporation. As noted by the Supreme Court,
"lt]he courts have recognized that the only method Congress
deemed effective to curb the evils of insider trading was a flat rule
taking the profits out of a class of transactions in which the
25 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
26 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 742.
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possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great., 27 While
§ 16(b) is based on a special relationship between the affected
class of persons and the corporation it is, quite unlike other
provisions governing insider trading, a strict liability provision,
since liability thereunder does not depend on the defendant's state
of mind at the time he dealt with the securities. Thus, there is
simply no scienter requirement.
The potential of § 16(b) as a weapon against insider trading is
circumscribed by the fact that action thereunder can only be
brought either by the corporation itself or by a shareholder suing
derivatively. This has left the SEC unable to take action under the
provision.28 Quite apart from this limitation which has made
reliance on Rule 1Ob-5 more necessary, the flowering of Rule 10b -
5 itself as a flexible weapon against insider trading in all its
ramifications, meant the relegation of § 16(b) to the background.29
Arguably, even without such limitation on § 16(b), Rule 10b-5
would still have been the weapon of choice, even against the class
of insiders in question.3 °
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act imposes secondary liability
on a control person for a breach of provisions of the Exchange
Act. The same holds true for rules made in accord with the
Exchange Act by a control person.31 Commenting on the similar
provisions in § 15 of the Securities Act, Professors Loss and
Seligman write that it was intended as a means to hold responsible
those corporations or other entities who employed dummy
directors.32  However, the provisions also encompass other
categories of controlled persons such as a broker-dealer's
registered representatives, of which the broker is clearly a
controlling person.33 By virtue of this provision, a controlling
27 Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972).
28 Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany:
Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177, 179 (1995) (citing
DONALD LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PREVENTION 343-44 (1991)).
29 Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market Pressures,
33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 323 (1995).
30 Id.
31 15 U.S.C. § 20(a) (1982).
32 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 742.
33 Id.
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person is secondarily liable for insider trading, to the same extent
as the controlled person. The same results could be achieved
through the general principles of aiding and abetting.
The picture that appears from the foregoing survey is that of a
panoply of legislative provisions aimed at enjoining insider trading
in whatever form it may take, with Rule 10b-5 as the flagship.
The constantly evolving nature of the legislation, quite apart from
the liberality with which the courts have interpreted Rule 10b-5
over the years to make it amenable to diverse transactions,
underscores the philosophy of the legislature as influenced by the
primary regulator, the SEC: to enjoin all transactions in securities
which appear fraudulent and offend a general notion of fairness.
This approach is justified primarily on the ground that the
activities enjoined are inimical to the integrity of the securities
market, thus eroding public confidence in it.
To make these provisions, especially Rule lOb-5, amenable to
its constantly changing notions, perceptions and views of which
transactions amount to insider trading, the SEC has resisted
attempts to statutorily define the offense. It has supported the
view that such a definition would reduce flexibility and that it was
advisable to await further judicial development of the area. This
makes the offense a shifty one, crying "out for the kind of
philosophic consistency that only studied legislation can
provide."35 As the law currently stands, a defendant may be liable
for insider trading on the basis of a transaction, the wrongfulness
of which was not apparent at the time it was contemplated and
executed. Recall the defendant's acts in Chiarella.36 The SEC
prosecuted the defendant for the offense, even though the
transaction complained of could not come within the ambit of the
offense, as then judicially configured. Similarly, in Dirks,37 the act
34 The Supreme Court has referred to § 1Ob, the statutory basis of Rule 1Ob-5, as a
"catch-all" provision. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976).
35 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 873. See also Donald C. Langevoort, The
SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy
Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 527, 531 (1990). Here, the SEC's aversion to
bright-line rules and some of its other policy preferences are explained as consequences
of its intent to jealously preserve "the largest degree of discretion to penalize conduct
that it determines, after the fact, to have been improper." Id.
36 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
37 Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Dirks was an officer of a broker-dealer firm
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complained of would have survived scrutiny even by an
ecclesiastical council, at least at the point of Dirks' disclosure of
the non-public information to the third parties that ultimately
traded with it. Yet Dirks was charged with an insider trading
violation.38
B. Current Approaches to the International Regulation of
Insider Trading
With the internationalization of the securities market39 in the
last two decades, the SEC has increasingly felt the need to extend
the reach of its insider trading regulation beyond the United States,
in order to effectively protect the U.S. markets and investors from
the impact of insider trading involving transactions with multi-
jurisdictional features. In a 1988 policy statement, 40 the SEC
articulated the principles and goals which it views as necessary for
the evolution of a truly global capital market system.4' Apart from
efficient structures and sound disclosure systems, the policy
emphasized fair and honest markets as being central to the
process.42 It stressed the need for transnational agreements that
that specialized in analyzing insurance company securities. Id. at 648. He was initially
sanctioned for discussing his investigation into an insurer's fraud with clients who later
traded on the information. Id. at 650-51. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's
judgment against Dirks, concluding that he had no duty to abstain from using the inside
information he had obtained. Id. at 667.
38 Id.
39 This may be defined as the process of closer integration of the major capital
markets of the world. For the current trends in this process, see HAL S. SCOTT & PHILLIP
A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 1 1-
13 (7th ed. 2000). The term is used interchangeably with globalization of the securities
market. The indicia of this internationalization include the growth and development of
other capital markets to levels comparable to the long-dominant U.S. market, the
establishment of links permitting dealers in one market to affect transactions in another
market, the capacity for twenty-four hour, round-the-clock trading, resulting largely from
improvements in information technology, and the progressive listing of same securities
in multiple markets. See John Thornell Thomas, Note, Icarus and His Waxen Wings:
Congress Attempts to Address the Challenges of Insider Trading in a Globalized
Securities Market, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 99, 102-06 (1990).
40 Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation
of International Securities Markets, Securities Act Release No. 6807, 53 Fed. Reg.
46,963 (Nov. 21, 1988) [hereinafter Policy Statement].
41 Id.
42 Id. at 46,965.
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will prevent inside traders from shielding themselves from the
laws of the states affected by their activities.43 Underlying the
SEC's move to articulate these principles and goals, is a wider
belief "that it has a responsibility to assume a leadership role in
international securities regulation."'
It can hardly be doubted that the SEC is eminently qualified to
assume such a leadership role, given its relative advantages in
terms of experience and size over other national regulators.45
However, its primary objective in so doing is not an altruistic urge
for a fair global securities order, but rather to protect U.S.
investors and safeguard the integrity of the U.S. markets. While
this limited objective may be excusable on account of the
jurisdictional restrictions to which the SEC is necessarily subject
as an organ of a state, it is paradoxical that the means by which it
has pursued that objective are in no sense limited. Perhaps in no
other area is its extended view of possible approaches to
international regulation more manifest than in the area of insider
trading regulation. In what is fast assuming the character of a
crusade, the SEC has hardly exercised any restraint in trying to
reach insider trading, actual or prospective, by action extending
well beyond its jurisdiction, the United States. The diverse means
by which it has carried out this crusade are examined below.
1. Invocation of the Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts Using
Either the Conduct or Effect Test46
Under the conduct test, the courts' jurisdiction is predicated on
the fact of certain conduct having occurred within the United
43 Id.
44 Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: An International
Perspective, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 312 (1990) (quoting Policy Statement of the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the Regulation of International Securities
Markets, Securities Act Release No. 6807, Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 84,341, at 89,576
(Nov. 1988)).
45 The SEC has more than six decades of experience in securities regulation and a
staff of about 2900. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor's
Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors and Maintains Market Integrity, at
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified May 30, 2001).
46 While there are other potential bases for jurisdiction, such as nationality, these
two bases are the most common. For a discussion of other bases, see Harvey L. Pitt et
al., Problems of Enforcement in the Multinational Securities Market, 9 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 375, 393-95 (1987).
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States.47  Thus, the fact of a transaction occurring in the United
States is sufficient to sustain an invocation of the courts'
jurisdiction to entertain a suit involving insider trading implicated
in that transaction. The main problem with this test in the context
of a globalizing securities market, is how to determine the extent
to which the different constituents of a transaction ought to be
located within a particular territory, and indeed the method of
determining their location, in order to sustain a conclusion that
conduct has occurred in that territory. 48 Concerning Rule lOb-5 in
particular, U.S. courts appear divided on the nature of the conduct
that must occur in the United States to sustain the assumption of
jurisdiction.49 While it is certain that any significant conduct will
suffice, it is not certain whether the constituent elements of a
violation must occur within the United States, i.e., whether such
conduct must causally be related to the fraud and resultant harm.
The possibility has been noted, however, that conduct such as the
use of U.S. professionals or American markets could sustain the
courts' jurisdiction under this basis.5' Given the state of
information technology today, and the ease with which cross-
border movement can be made, the potential reach of this test is
quite wide, as it will increasingly be easier to find that a particular
act or transaction has some connection to the United States.
Under the effect test, the U.S. courts will assume jurisdiction
pursuant to any conduct, wherever occurring, which adversely
affects U.S. interests.5 Along these lines, the purchase from a
Canadian corporation of its shares by its controlling shareholders,
arranged at less than fair market prices, has been held to sustain
subject matter jurisdiction in a U.S. court, since such a purchase
depresses the corporation's stock listed on U.S. exchanges. 52 U.S.
47 Id.
48 Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 913 (1998).
49 id.
50 Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities
Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 175, 185 (1993). See Kauthar SDN BHD (a Malaysian Corporation) v.
Stenderg, 149 F.3d 659, 663-67 (7th Cir. 1998) (analyzing the variations in the
application of the conduct test).
51 Langevoort, supra note 50, at 185.
52 Id.
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jurisdiction was assumed even though the transaction complained
of was executed entirely within Canada. 3 In the new age, this is a
very broad test indeed. There is nothing in the test to prevent its
application where, for instance, an American citizen visits a free
internet website, run from a server stationed in Egypt, and effects
stock transactions which ultimately prove detrimental to his
interests. Although he visited the web site without any invitation
or prior notice to the owner (the website being open to all comers),
the U.S. courts can sustain their jurisdiction under the effect test
by arguing that the harm to the citizen is a harm to U.S. interests.
The invocation of U.S. courts' jurisdiction in the context of
cross-border insider trading has severe limitations, even though it
has been effective in some cases. First is the problem of
enforcement. Even where jurisdiction is successfully invoked and
the necessary judicial remedy obtained, enforcement may prove
difficult, unless the persons implicated are within U.S. territory or
have substantial assets therein. While extradition may be a
possibility in some circumstances, it is an extreme approach,
which will likely involve litigation in foreign courts, thereby
defeating or at least diluting the gains of invoking U.S.
jurisdiction. Second, is the fact that such jurisdiction, when
invoked, often involves compelling foreign banks and other
institutions to reveal information that is otherwise protected under
the laws of their countries of origin.54 This leads to a breach of
international comity and consequent resentment on the part of the
foreign country and its institutions.55
Despite the success that may be achieved by the SEC in
individual cases with this approach, the net result is resistance by
these other countries, through the enactment of new non-
disclosure laws (blocking statutes) aimed at strengthening existing
bank secrecy laws.56 The SEC appears, therefore, to have
reconsidered its modus operandi, resulting in aspects of its 1988
policy statement, which acknowledge the necessity of international
53 Id.
54 Andrew S. Brooslin, Note, Enforcing Insider Trading Laws: The Need for
International Cooperation, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 397, 405 (1997).
55 Id. at 406.
56 Pitt et al., supra note 46, at 411-12; Brooslin, supra note 54, at 405-06.
[Vol. 27
2001] INTERNATIONAL INSIDER TRADING
cooperation and sensitivity to cultural and sovereignty issues. 57
International cooperation has largely taken the form of action
under bilateral agreements aimed at facilitating access to
information in the investigation and prosecution of cross-border
offenses generally or insider trading specifically.58
2. Action Under Various U.S. International Agreements
These principally take two forms: action under Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and action under Memoranda of
Understanding (MOUs).59 MLATs are bilateral agreements under
which countries agree to assist each other in the investigation of
criminal matters. The major problem with such agreements is that
they usually have a dual criminality requirement, so that unless the
act being investigated is a crime in both countries, the benefits of
the agreement are not available. Given that insider trading is not
prohibited in several countries, and that even when prohibited the
differing enforcement regimes between countries create a daunting
57 Policy Statement, supra note 40, at 46,964-46,965. The statement declared thus:
In seeking solutions to common problems, securities regulators should be
sensitive to cultural differences and national sovereignty concerns. As
regulators seek to minimize differences between systems, the goal of investor
protection should be balanced with the need to be responsive to the realities of
each marketplace .... As access to international securities markets by brokers,
issuers, investment companies, investment advisers, and securities traders from
all countries has increased, the need for access by enforcement authorities to
information about foreign trading activity and the capital raising operations of
foreign companies has expanded. Pertinent information and evidence regarding
such activities frequently is located outside of a particular regulator's
jurisdiction. Accordingly, securities regulators should continue to forge a
network of bilateral and multilateral surveillance and information sharing
arrangements that are effective from an enforcement standpoint and sensitive to
national sovereignty concerns.
Id. at 46, 963-65.
58 Id.
59 Action under the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter the Convention], is also possible, since the United States is a
signatory to the Convention. The Convention provides for three common methods of
foreign discovery, namely, letters rogatory, evidence taken by a consular official, and
evidence taken by private commissioners. Pitt et al., supra note 46, at 430-31. Since the
convention is available only in connection with actual litigation, the SEC cannot avail
itself of the provisions in connection with an investigation. Id at 431. There are other
limitations as well. Id at 430-31.
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problem.6 ° Other limitations flow from the character of the MLAT
as a treaty. An intergovernmental agreement requires much
negotiation between each government involved. To circumvent
the limitations of the MLAT, the SEC has entered into MOUs,
which are specifically tailored toward insider trading
investigation.61
The MOU is essentially an agreement between the SEC and
another regulator and is specifically structured to facilitate the
exchange of information in the investigation of securities fraud
and insider trading.62 Unlike the MLAT, the MOU takes less time
to negotiate, does not need to be formally ratified by the
legislature of both countries for it to be effective, and is generally
more expeditious. 63  Also, there is notably no dual criminality
requirement. 64 Although technically a non-binding agreement
under which assistance with a foreign investigator is voluntary,
assistance for SEC investigations under MOUs is more prevalent
than under MLATs.65
A standard feature of the MOU is that information received
thereunder must remain confidential.66 To reinforce its capacity
for obtaining foreign regulators' cooperation under the MOUs, the
SEC sought for and obtained the adoption by Congress of the
International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act (ISECA) in
1990.67 This specifically authorizes the SEC to guarantee foreign
regulators that it will maintain the confidentiality of any disclosed
information and will not release this information under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 68 Thus the SEC is exempted
60 Pitt et al., supra note 46, at 432-34 (discussing the problems encountered by the
SEC in working with what is perhaps the most prominent of such treaties-the MLAT
with Switzerland, Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973,
U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019).
61 Brooslin, supra note 54, at 416-17.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at417-18.
65 Id. at 417.
66 Id.
67 International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
550, 104 Stat. 2714 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
68 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
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from adhering to FOIA if foreign regulators demonstrate in good
faith that public disclosure of the information will violate their
laws. 69 As a result of this legislation, foreign authorities are more
likely to cooperate with the SEC in its investigative efforts. Prior
to ISECA, the SEC sponsored other legislation aimed at
strengthening its capacity to investigate and penalize insider
trading, especially in the international context: the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA)' ° and the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).7' The ITSA
strengthens the SEC's enforcement powers by increasing the
penalties for insider trading, while the ITSFEA achieves the same
purpose by empowering the SEC to grant at its discretion,
investigatory assistance to foreign securities authorities without
need for reciprocity from such foreign authorities.72
3. Exportation of Insider Trading Laws
The SEC has also exported U.S. insider trading laws to other
jurisdictions, as part of the crusade to stem insider trading
globally. In its 1988 policy statement, the SEC stressed its quest
for minimization of the differences between national systems by
regulators.73 In furtherance of this quest, the SEC has sought
implementation on a global scale of securities legislation based on
the U.S. model.74 It has achieved this through a combination of
lobbying and pressure brought to bear on the regulatory authorities
of different jurisdictions. Entertaining no illusions that these laws
would be enforced with fervor in these jurisdictions, it is likely
that in the short run at least the major benefit of such laws would
be to criminalize insider trading, thereby facilitating the use of
existing MLATs for which the dual criminality requirement would
be satisfied by these new laws. Recent enactment of legislation
69 International Securities Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 10 1-550, § 202(d)
Stat. 2714, 2715.
70 Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-3876, 98 Stat. 1264
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
71 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C).
72 Thomas, supra note 39, at 117-26 (discussing the statute, its purpose and
application).
73 Policy Statement, supra note 40 at 46,963-64.
74 Mahoney, supra note 44, at 305-06.
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prohibiting insider trading in several developed securities markets,
along lines similar to the U.S. model, is a result of missionary
work performed by the SEC.75 An example of the SEC approach
at work is the case of Switzerland:
[T]he SEC's ability to use enforcement actions to regulate
insider trading in European markets could be hampered by the
existence of bank secrecy laws, particularly in Switzerland,
which has a tradition of stringent bank secrecy laws. The
conflict between Swiss law and the SEC's insider trading
program led the SEC to mount an aggressive, and ultimately
successful, campaign to persuade the Swiss government to bring
its insider trading legislation into line with U.S. law as
interpreted by the SEC.76
4. Residual Approaches
Apart from the foregoing approaches, the SEC may seek and
rely on the voluntary cooperation of individuals and entities from
which it requires information, on mutually agreeable terms.77 It
may also rely on ad hoc approaches, such as the negotiation of
new procedures for obtaining evidence in the course of an
investigation.78 The latter is exemplified by SEC's resorting to the
Attorney-General (AG) of the Bahamas in connection with the
investigation of the investment banker Dennis Levine.79 In this
case, the SEC, not wanting to get entangled with the Bahamian
courts, approached the AG of the Bahamas directly, and was able
to obtain his written opinion that the transactions conducted by
Levine through Bank Leu International Ltd. were not banking
transactions, and that criminal sanctions would therefore not apply
to the release of the subpoenaed documents. On the strength of
this opinion, the bank released the information sought by the
SEC.80
75 James A. Kehoe, Recent Development, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The
Enforcement of U.S. Insider Trading Laws Internationally, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 345,
353 (1995).
76 Mahoney, supra note 44, at 317 (citations omitted).
77 Id.
78 Pitt et al., supra note 46, at 428.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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Worthy of mention here is the question of a supranational
securities regulator, whose powers would naturally include the
enforcement of the prohibition of insider trading. The
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
and the International Federation of Stock Exchanges (FIBV) have
been touted as possible candidates for such a role.8 However,
there is little to indicate from their activities and pronouncements
that they entertain such ambition.8 2  Others would tap the
coordinating body for the world's central banks, the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) established in 1930, as a
candidate.83 Others have suggested an international fraud squad, a
multinational team with the right mix of expertise, assembled to
pursue questionable securities transactions in cases where national
regulators are unable or unwilling to do so.84 However, the
possibility of such a supranational body remains dim, for reasons
ranging from the substantial start-up and maintenance costs to the
difficulty of the same body dealing with highly diversified laws,
regulations and trading practices around the globe.85  It is,
however, not far-fetched to believe that given its pre-eminence
among national regulators, and its declared wish to play a leading
role in policing the international securities market, the SEC would
play a major role in deciding what form such a body would take, if
it ultimately is established. Indeed, if an existing association of
securities regulators like the IOSCO became the chosen vehicle,
the SEC should be able to imbue the body with its regulatory
philosophy, with the same fervor that it has brought to bear on the
exportation of U.S. insider trading laws.
In summary, the insider trading regime championed by the
SEC has evolved through a process of continuous near-obsessive
expansion of existing statutory provisions. The regime's central
theme is to eliminate insider trading as inimical to the proper
functioning of the securities market. This process of continuous
81 Id.
82 Peter E. Millspaugh, Global Securities Trading: The Question of a Watchdog, 26
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 355, 371-72 (1992).
83 Jeffrey E. Garten, Regulating the Global Stock Market, in INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: NEW DIRECTIONS 181, 192-93 (Surendra K. Kaushik ed., 1989),
cited in Millspaugh, supra note 82, at 373 n. 119.
84 See Millspaugh, supra note 82, at 373 n.122.
85 See id. at 371-72.
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reinforcement saw the emergence of Rule lOb-5 as the major
battle-axe in the SEC's war against insider trading. The chief
attraction is its malleability, and consequent amenability, to use in
characterizing unwanted transactions as insider trading, often ex
post facto; a factor that gives the SEC immense flexibility in the
choice of which transactions to prosecute and when to do so. The
rule has constantly been subject to the overriding dictates of
expediency. In effect, the rule expands the SEC's power through
enhanced discretion. With the internationalization of the securities
market, the SEC's power to control the securities market and
insider trading in particular became compromised by the ability of
market participants to effect foreign transactions of the type the
SEC opposes within the United States. To maintain and expand its
power, the SEC has adopted various measures aimed at ensuring
that transactions occurring outside the United States, which have
any effect on, or contact with, the U.S. market are well within its
reach, irrespective of countervailing claims by the market
participants involved or even other national authorities. The effort
to enjoin insider trading internationally, and the force with which
the task has been approached, is part of the same continuous
process of regulatory (and institutional) power expansion.86
86 Taking for granted the desirability of insider trading prohibition, this mode of
analysis assumes that there are other alternatives to the approach currently adopted by
the SEC in enforcing the prohibition. In other words, it assumes that the SEC's belief
"that it has a responsibility to assume a leadership role in international securities
regulation," Mahoney, supra note 44, at 312 and accompanying text, even if not
misconceived, does not necessarily justify its current near-unilateral approach to global
insider trading regulation. Multilateral action among states, as exemplified by the
European Community Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30, on
insider dealing, is a possible alternative, at least conceptually. On this point, see Lynda
M. Ruiz, Note, European Community Directive on Insider Dealing: A Model for
Effective Enforcement of Insider Trading in International Securities Markets, 33 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1995). This mode of analysis is supported by the "confessions"
of former SEC officials expressing how a measure of arrogance, and often, an inability to
distinguish adequately between the public interest and institutional self-interest, affects
the work of the agency. It is similarly in tandem with research in organization theory
showing that large organizations over time inevitably begin to displace stated goals with
more self-serving institutional goals. See JAMES Cox, ROBERT HILLMAN & DONALD
LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 14 (2nd ed. 1997).
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III.Problems with the International Regulation of Insider
Trading
A. Erosion of the Normative Foundations of Insider Trading
Regulation
Economic regulatory schemes often are fashioned within the
crucible of major economic disasters. The regulatory scheme of
the Securities and Exchange Acts falls within this class, having
been enacted in the wake of the Great Depression. As is often the
case, legislative bills proposed in such circumstances are fuelled
by public outcry and outrage, deprecating the ills leading up to the
economic disaster. The legislation is ultimately passed, with more
than ample provision for the extermination of these ills, real or
imagined.
The hearings leading up to Congress's passage of the securities
laws show that these laws conform to this pattern.87  These
hearings catalogued market abuses, especially manipulation and
trading with insider information, preceding and precipitating the
stock market crash.88 More recent research has come to question
the existence of some of these abuses, indicating that they may
have been exaggerated for political reasons. 89 If indeed they were
exaggerated for that reason, the possibility is then not far-fetched
that some of the measures would be over-kill or superfluous. One
cannot help drawing a parallel between these events and those
leading up to the enactment of the English Bubble Act in 1720,90
87 COX ET. AL., supra note 86, at 6.
88 Id. Concerning the Blue Sky laws, Loss and Seligman similarly write of the
relative strictness of Western and Midwestern securities statutes as a probable carry-over
from the time "[wihen an 'agrarian West' was bled by a 'Moneyed East."' Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 9. Quite beyond the pitiable image of poor farmers losing
their money to securities brokers and tricky investment bankers from the East, there is
the political element of Western banks, bank regulators, and farmers who lobbied for the
legislation for parochial reasons. These groups probably sponsored the statutes, starting
with Kansas in 1911, to halt the drain of funds through general investment in securities,
instead of bank deposits; a situation which had the effect of reducing the funds available
for bank intermediation, impairing the influence of the state bank regulators and raising
the cost of funds for the farmers borrowing from the banks. See Jonathan Macey &
Geoffrey Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 351 (1991).
89 Cox ET AL., supra note 86, at 6.
90 6 Geo. I, ch. 18 (Eng.).
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in the wake of speculative market activities attending the South
Sea Company's bid to assume the public debts of England. 9'
Perceiving harm in this speculation and related activities, the
government moved to halt them by enacting the Bubble Act,
which was to stultify the formation of joint stock companies,
especially those with freely transferable stock, for about a
century.92 In so doing, the government showed a misapprehension
of the factors fuelling the speculation; a point that is clear today,
but was perhaps not so in eighteenth century England. 93
Given the foregoing scenario, it often takes a new generation,
different from one in which the legislative scheme was
established, to take a less emotional and more dispassionate look
at the scheme and question the underlying assumptions, resulting
from ex ante exaggeration or misapprehension of facts. Even if
the assumptions are correct initially, they may no longer hold in
the context of supervening developments. This has been the case
with insider trading jurisprudence in the United States: A near-
unanimous belief in the reprehensible character of insider trading
dominated thinking from the very conceptual stage of the
securities laws. This was coupled with an uncertainty as to the
best approach to adopt in arresting the problem. This uncertainty
manifests itself in the discretion given the SEC in the Exchange
Act, to deal with insider trading and other securities fraud,
following from the fact that the means and ends of dealing with
the problems could not readily be articulated.94 This explains the
multiple, alternative but mutually reinforcing approaches of the
SEC to insider trading regulation, especially prior to the ultimate
establishment with the judiciary's support, of Rule lOb-5 as its
flagship. Indeed, Rule lOb-5 itself was a fortuitous development,
a result of an unsure SEC groping in its toolbox of legislative
instruments, and mother luck smiling on its efforts. Loss and
Seligman chronicling the circumstances of the Rule's formulation
write, "[t]he whole development was unplanned. Like the British
Empire, which Eamon de Valera called 'a domain created in a
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 24-34
(1997).
94 See Cox ET AL., supra note 86, at 7.
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moment of world absent-mindedness' it just happened." 95
Since the enactment of the securities statutes in 1933 and
1934, and the subsequent adoption of Rule lOb-5 in 1942, a lot has
changed in the scenario described above. First is the articulation
of more intellectually rigorous justifications for insider trading
regulation, countering the indignation and intuitive feelings of
unfairness which attended the congressional hearings preceding
the legislation; where the use of insider information was described
as "immoral," "unscrupulous," "unfair," and a betrayal of
fiduciary duties. 96 Though the rhetoric of regulation is replete with
allusions to the development of fair and orderly markets, fairness
in the intuitive sense97 is no longer the major philosophical
underpinning of insider trading regulation. Quite apart from such
notions of fairness, the major justifications of insider trading
regulation can be subsumed under four headings, each of which
has variations in theme, the detailed exploration of which is
immaterial to the thesis of this article.
1. Harm to Investors
Those who hold this view contend that when insiders trade
with inside information, the price of the securities changes to the
detriment of subsequent traders in those securities. 98 Even if it can
be claimed that the actual party with whom the insider trades is not
harmed, subsequent traders are prejudiced to the extent that if the
insider buys, there is an upward movement in the price, leading to
increased cost for the subsequent purchaser, and if the insider
sells, the price is depressed to the detriment of subsequent
95 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 777. For a brief introduction to Rule
lOb-5 see id. at 777-80.
96 See Stock Exchange Practices, Report of the Comm. on Banking and Currency,
S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 55 (1934).
97 In Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 249 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), Justice
Blackmun spoke of the inherent unfairness of insider trading. But such an allusion lacks
credibility, even among supporters of deregulation "since the concepts of what is 'fair'
and what is 'unfair' are given no content." Id.
98 This may be seen as unreasonable, given efficient markets and the fact that the
subsequent price resulting from the insider's trades reflects all available information and
is therefore the right price. (Indeed, this is one of the arguments of those opposed to the
prohibition of insider trading.) However, the efficient market hypothesis itself and the
extent of its influence on the markets are intensely debated issues. See JOHN F.
MARSHALL & M. E. ELLIS: INVESTMENT BANKING AND BROKERAGE 166-67 (1994).
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sellers. 99 Variations on this theme are common currency.'°
2. Public Confidence or Integrity of the Market Theory
The contention here is that insider trading harms the market by
eroding public confidence. At its root, this contention is related to
notions of fairness, since the erosion of public confidence in the
market is furthered by the public's perception that trading on
inside information is unfair. However, it differs by emphasizing
not the intrinsic inequity, badness or immorality of insider trading
but rather its effect, which is concrete, more measurable, and
conceptually independent of the act's perceived inequity,
immorality, or badness. What is more, the theory transcends the
possible justification of insider trading through a case-by-case
approach, which looks at the circumstances of particular
transactions. It does this by emphasizing the prohibition of insider
trading as significant, not because it compensates individual
investors for identifiable losses but because it deters general
economic harm.1l
3. Impairment of the Market's Allocative Efficiency
This posits that insider trading engenders delay in the release
and dissemination of material information by corporate insiders,
who benefit from such delay because it enables them to trade first
with it.'02 This in turn distorts the capacity of the market to
redirect resources promptly, through appropriate pricing of
securities, to those firms who, from available information, have
99 See William K. S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on
Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom under SEC Rule
1Ob-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1234-35 (1981).
lo0 For other related themes concerning harm to the corporation and its shareholders,
see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 265-68 (1986); R. J. Haft, The Effect of Insider
Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV.
1051, 1051-64 (1982); D. A. Winslow & Seth C. Anderson, From Shoeless Joe Jackson
to Ivan Boesky: A Sporting Response to Law and Economics Criticism of the Regulation
of Insider Trading, 81 Ky. L.J. 295, 311-15 (1993).
101 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 761. A related theme is that insider
trading impairs market liquidity. See Mark Klock, Mainstream Economics and the Case
for Prohibiting Insider Trading, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 297, 330 (1994).
102 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 761-62; R. Schotland, Unsafe at Any
Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Markets, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425,
1448-49 (1967).
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the best prospects of using such resources productively.° 3
4. Property Rights Argument
The theory here is that inside information is corporate property
belonging to the company that invested resources in its
development. As is the case with other corporate property, the
insider is not entitled to appropriate this information to his
personal benefit.'0 n
Soon after Rule lOb-5 came into force, the courts gradually
adopted the rule, starting with the 1946 decision in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Company, °5 which found for the plaintiff in a
claim for accounting by shareholders who purchased stock from
other shareholders without disclosure of material information. 10 6
The rule received further impetus from SEC's 1961 administrative
decision In re Cady, Roberts & Co.'°7 But not long thereafter,
while the SEC and the courts continued to nurture the rule and
other provisions aimed at stemming insider trading, the prohibition
itself began to be questioned in some quarters.'0 8 Led by Henry
Manne, a movement gradually developed that opposed the
prohibition of insider trading on various grounds. 109 The members
of this movement, the "anti-prohibitionists," argued that the
rationale, method, and scope of the prohibition were
misconceived. °"0 The grounds of their opposition, just as those
103 Id.
104 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 772-73. For a variation of this theme
which likens insider trading to secret profits, see CLARK, supra note 100, at 273.
105 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
106 Id. at 803.
107 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
108 It has been observed that intellectual criticism of the SEC's policy-making has
come in two waves. The first, marked by the scholarship of Louis Loss, sought to align
doctrine with the philosophical underpinning of regulation, as well as other historical
"first principles." LANGEVOORT, supra note 28, at 527-28. It took for granted the aims
of securities regulation. The second wave came in the 1960s, and was initially
championed largely by economists. It questioned the assumptions underlying securities
regulation, such as the virtues of mandatory disclosure. This second wave (to which the
critical works on insider trading belong) dominates today. See id.
109 See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966), for a
more in-depth exploration of Manne's viewpoint.
110 Id.
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given by the supporters of insider trading regulation, the
"prohibitionists," come with variations to the basic themes which
are not germane to this paper. However, it is noteworthy that most
of these grounds directly oppose those of the prohibitionists,
which is quite different from merely providing alternative
arguments thereto. The grounds may be grouped as follows:
a. No Harm to Investors and Related Constituencies
The argument here is that insider trading does not harm the
investor who trades with, or at the same time as an insider, nor
does it harm shareholders of the corporation whose stock is traded,
nor society generally."' Insider trading, it posits, is a victimless
crime. The investor who trades with an insider is usually a willing
trader who would have traded anyway. If the insider had not come
along, she would have sold (or bought) from another person." 2
Indeed, by trading with her, the insider probably affords her a
higher price than she would otherwise have obtained; or in the
case of a sale by an insider, a lower price than the purchaser could
have had otherwise. More generally, such trading adjusts the price
of the securities for traders in the whole market."1 3 Also, it is
argued that there is no evidence indicating that shareholders of
corporations whose managers engage in insider trading are
bothered by such transactions.' l They seem more concerned with
appreciation in the corporation's distributable profits. Along this
I I See BARRY RIDER & MICHAEL ASHE, INSIDER CRIME 3-4 (1993).
112 Id.
113 See N. ARSHADI & T.H. EYSELL, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE INSIDER
TRADING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 132 (1993). It is arguable that there is no advantage
really to the seller in these circumstances, since she could even get a higher price if the
insider fully disclosed the information to the whole market. The problem, however, is
that without the personal gains from insider trading as an incentive, the insider would
have no impetus to disclose the information to the market at all. Therefore, a demand for
full disclosure or abstention from trading as the law currently requires, if heeded by the
insider, would lead largely to abstention rather than full disclosure. Effectively, current
information will not be disclosed to the market at all for a long time, during which the
market will continue to trade on the basis of outdated information. Indeed, a company's
internal policies might even favor the non-disclosure of such information over a
substantial period, if keeping it secret enhances the company's strategic position vis-A-
vis its competitors. Only an inside trader, given the strong personal incentives to trade,
can then save the market from outdated information.
114 Id.
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line it has been argued that if companies were much bothered by
insider trading by the rank and file of corporate employees,
companies would have prohibited such trading contractually
through clauses in the employment contracts of their managers,
even before the general prohibition of insider trading, "5 but this
has not been the case. Concerning society generally, it is argued
that insider trading causes no harm, but is instead beneficial, along
the lines discussed under "allocative efficiency" below.
b. Allocative Efficiency
The argument here is that instead of impairing the allocative
efficiency of the market, insider trading actually enhances it. It
does this by giving insiders the impetus to promptly reflect
available information in the market price of securities through
their trading. Material information may, due to corporate policy or
for some other corporate reasons, be withheld from the public after
it becomes known to insiders. During the period it is withheld, the
market price of the company's securities is inaccurate since it does
not reflect available information concerning the true state of
affairs. When insiders trade during this period, such trading
allows the information to be reflected in the market price. 116
c. Compensation for Insiders
It has been argued that insider trading is a means of adequately
compensating insiders who are corporate entrepreneurs, thereby
ensuring that those with the requisite entrepreneurial skills remain
in the corporate world as managers of enterprise. 117 It permits
them to share in the gains they produce for the company (which
include inside information) thereby providing added impetus for
115 See J.R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY 37
(1991).
116 MANNE, supra note 109, at 101-02. A closely related argument is that insider
trading smoothes price changes. It does this by allowing information to permeate the
market gradually when insiders trade, leading to gradual and timelier adjustment of the
price of securities, especially in response to piecemeal, incremental changes in corporate
affairs. See Henry Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REv.
547, 573-74 (1969). Thus, by the time the full information or complete picture becomes
publicly available, the change in price will be less sudden and drastic than would have
been the case without the preceding insider trading.
117 MANNE, supra note 109, at 110.
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them to be more productive. Without the prospect of additional
income from insider trading, such persons may not be optimally
motivated to put in their best in terms of innovation and
galvanization of modem enterprise. Worse, they may even decide
to try their skills in other areas of endeavor, outside business
management. 118
d. Property Rights and Private Ordering
Inside information, it is asserted, is similar to other forms of
corporate property. Instead of regulation by law, it is better and
simpler that the corporation be at liberty to dispose of the
information by contractual arrangements. Such arrangements can
permit insiders to trade with inside information, if the corporation
so desires, or prohibit it if not desired.119
For the purpose of this paper, the most noteworthy point on the
state of the debate between the prohibitionists and the anti-
prohibitionists is the fact that both sides now command substantial
followership. It is no longer a lopsided debate, with Henry Manne
and acolytes laboring against well-entrenched notions on insider
trading. So strong have the anti-prohibitionists become that a
commentator (himself a prohibitionist) noted, "even those who are
pro-regulation have tended to backslide.""12 This was made in
reference to an acknowledgement by other writers that they "have
become less and less convinced that it [insider trading] is the
118 Id.; MACEY, supra note 115, at 45-47; W.D. Carlton & D.R. Fischel, The
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861-72 (1983). A countervailing
argument is that such a compensation scheme for insiders is arbitrary, since an insider's
compensation would be limited by the amount of securities he is capable of purchasing.
The insider's returns from his trading activities would be a function of the capital at his
disposal rather than the value of his contribution to the company. Another problem with
this compensation scheme is that there is no way of ensuring that only the insiders who
contribute to the production of information get to trade with it, since it is difficult to
isolate specific persons to whom the production of any piece of valuable information
may be ascribed. Finally, the scheme has a negative incentive built into it, since it would
allow insiders to trade in good news, as well as bad news, the latter involving no value-
added to the company.
119 See J.R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules
against Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 58-63, (1984); D. Haddock & J.R.
Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449, 1449-51 (1986).
120 See Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings before the Committee on Banking and
Currency, U.S. Senate, 73d Congress (1932), cited in Harry McVea, What is Wrong with
Insider Dealing?, 15 LEGAL STUD. 390, 409 (1995).
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heinous and immoral act which it is often represented to be."1 21
The ground won by the anti-prohibition movement was not
achieved by sudden flight, but rather through the dogged
deployment of arguments based largely on economic theory to
counter the established position of the opposition. While there
remains currently a credible economic case for the continued
prohibition of insider trading, the case is no longer overwhelming
and is at best at par with the economic case for deregulating it.
122
The fact that the arguments of the anti-prohibitionists are
largely, if not solely, economic in character, may be thought of as
a weakness, since the prohibitionists deploy both economic and
non-economic arguments 123 in support of their position. However,
this weakness is mitigated by the fact that the SEC's regulatory
activities as well as court decisions have in recent times been
substantially premised on economic justifications. 24 The efficient
market hypothesis is notable in this regard. Concerning this
hypothesis, Gilson & Kraakman write: "it structures debate over
the future of securities regulation both within and without the
Securities and Exchange Commission."'125  Additionally, it has
served as the intellectual premise for a major revision of the
disclosure system administered by the Commission; and it has
even begun to influence judicial decisions and the actual practice
of law. In short, the efficient capital market hypothesis "is now
the context in which serious discussion of the regulation of the
121 RIDER & ASHE, supra note 111, preface.
122 McVea, supra note 120, at 392; See also Merrit B. Fox, Insider Trading in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate What? 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 299
(1992).
123 Fairness in the intuitive sense and related purely ethical arguments fall within the
class of non-economic arguments. So also, and more importantly perhaps, does the
argument that insider trading erodes public confidence in the markets. While such
erosion of confidence has economic effects, it is doubtful whether its occurrence (as
distinct from its effects) is a necessary economic result of insider trading. It may well be
that insider trading actually has no other negative economic consequence, and yet the
public still erroneously perceives it as being wrong, thereby leading to loss of confidence
in the markets.
124 R. Gilson & R. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 549-50 (1984). It should be noted, however, that the efficient market
hypothesis has come to be the subject of much debate. See MARSHALL & ELLIS, supra
note 98, at 166-67.
125 Id.
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financial markets takes place."'126
Given the foregoing state of affairs, the policy considerations
underlying insider trading regulation are properly due for thorough
reassessment by the SEC itself. Such reassessment should be
consultative, and should probe in a well-rounded manner the
necessity for continued regulation, as well as the method and
scope of regulation if indeed a necessity is established. The
situation does not provide a basis for the continued strengthening
of enforcement mechanisms and penalties against insider trading,
as the SEC has done in the recent past.127 Beyond this, it provides
even less credible a basis for the extension of the prohibition into
the international scene. A domestic scene in dire need of a review
is politically, intellectually, and even morally inauspicious for the
exportation of insider trading regulation to the global arena. It is
ideally a point for stock taking rather than expansion in the
enterprise of regulation. Extension to the global markets is a
question that should crop up only after the domestic aspect has
been resolved. Even if a reassessment were ultimately to favor the
retention of the prohibition in the United States, its extension to
the international scene through SEC activities would still merit
independent consideration.
Apart from its interest in protecting U.S. investors from
insider trading, irrespective of wherever such trading is effected,
the SEC has executed its global crusade against insider trading on
the assumption that such transactions are inimical to the
development of other national markets, and hence the international
market. However, no consensus exists among other national
regulators and market participants that such transactions have an
overall negative effect on their markets. This is most evident from
the laxity with which insider trading laws have traditionally been
enforced in many of these jurisdictions. Cases in point are Japan,
where insider trading laws were instituted under U.S. influence
126 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 124, at 550 (emphasis added). See, for
example, the dicta of Judge Easterbrook in Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892
F.2d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 1989), relying on the efficient market hypothesis and stating that
"the Securities and Exchange Commission believes that markets correctly value the
securities of well-followed firms, so that new sales may rely on information that has
been digested and expressed in the security's price."
127 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000); supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
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after the Second World War, 128 and Germany where such laws
were grudgingly passed pursuant to a directive of the European
Community. 129  While lax enforcement may be argued to be a
result of inadequate resources in some countries, this does not
explain the near-total lack of criminal convictions (or even
prosecutions) in other countries. In these other countries, even
with inadequate resources, enforcement agencies have managed to
keep a tab on other crimes and offenses. Why not insider trading?
The fact remains that national regulators do not all regard insider
trading the same way. They are known to have been openly
divided over the necessity of its regulation. 130 Beyond this, it has
been argued that
[t]he most plausible explanation for the failure of the major
securities markets to adopt regulations patterned on the
American Model is that investors have not demanded them as a
precondition to committing funds, even as internationalization
has increased the number of competitors for investors' capital.
Perhaps even more interesting is the willingness of U.S.
investors to withdraw money from the U.S market to invest in
the Tokyo stock market, which has long been noted for
extremely lax enforcement of insider trading laws. . . .[I]f
rampant insider trading destroys investor confidence, then the
Tokyo investors should be a demoralized lot. It is difficult to
explain the level of enthusiasm evident in the Tokyo market's
rise without assuming that these investors cannot rationally
evaluate the losses they suffer as a consequence of insider
trading, or that they do not perceive such losses to be
128 See Louis Loss, MAKOTO YAZAWA & BARBARA ANN BANOFF, JAPANESE
SECURITIES REGULATION 191-92 (1983).
129 See Standen, supra note 28, at 177-78, 206.
130 Mahoney, supra note 44, at 313 nn. 38-39. The 1989 annual conference of the
International Organization of Securities Regulators (IOSCO) was for instance, marked
by the reluctance of participants to change key aspects of their regulatory schemes.
German Stock Exchange Federation Executive Vice-President Ruediger von Rosen is
reported to have emphasized that value should be attached to giving investors a choice
between different regulatory regimes. The conference having been held before the
reluctant enactment of insider trading legislation by Germany in 1994, insider trading
obviously was a major issue with the German regulatory scheme, from the SEC's point
of view.
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significant. 13 1
This underscores the point that given the same transactions and
fact patterns, results which may validly be opposed in the United
States as harmful to market confidence may not be similarly
opposed abroad. So, while in the Japanese markets, there likely
exist several transactions capable of eroding public confidence, it
just happens that insider trading is not one of them. 3 2
An issue worth considering at this stage is whether a resolution
that the insider trading prohibition be retained domestically in the
United States would not necessarily justify its automatic extension
to the global arena, since in the internationalized securities
markets, the prohibition can be neutralized by transactions
originated offshore. An answer would be that such a line of
reasoning is a weak normative basis for the extension, as it
emphasizes no principle other than self-interest. Indeed, it is a
recipe for anarchy given the possibility, even if only notional, that
other states and their regulators may adopt the same approach. It
is also arguable that the possibility of neutralization by
transactions originated offshore should ab initio, be a major factor
in the ultimate decision to proscribe or legitimize insider trading
domestically. If such neutralization is assessed to be immitigable,
or capable of mitigation only with significant difficulties, then the
prohibition may well have to be reversed or otherwise modulated,
at least to provide domestic market participants a level playing
field with foreigners.
More generally, it may be noted that as the world's economies
become increasingly inter-linked through unstoppable
technological innovations and changes in the demands of the
market, occasions will increasingly present themselves for cross-
border neutralization of domestic economic policies. Changes in
labor legislation and practices in one country for instance, can
have great impact on industrial investment in another country, as
manufacturers move their production facilities in search of low-
wage countries where profits can be maximized. 3 3 The very labor
131 Mahoney, supra note 44, at 307-08. The Tokyo markets took a fall in the events
leading up to the Japanese "Big Bang" reforms of 1996. See SCOTT & WELLONS, supra
note 39, 8-39 to 8-74.
132 Id.
133 Contentious labor practices in several developing countries have led to the
displacement of U.S. workers, resulting from the relocation of employers' facilities to
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practices eliciting such relocation of facilities may be
objectionable, ethically or otherwise, to the latter country, but this
would not by itself justify unilateral moves by her regulators to
enjoin the labor practices in ways similar to those adopted by the
SEC in its global crusade against insider trading. 134 Indeed, such
an approach could with time lead to a plethora of quixotic
domestic agencies in a chimerical chase around the globe, with
grave costs and implications that will be explored below in Part
IIIB of this paper. Suffice it to say that what is required is instead
a more cosmopolitan view of international economic issues, or at
least a form of positive nationalism. The former affords a sense of
global citizenship that is devoid of zero-sum nationalism, and the
latter though primarily geared towards enhancing national well
being, assiduously avoids doing so at other nations' expense. 35
The SEC should therefore view itself as having in this new age,
responsibilities towards a global citizenry-secondary perhaps,
but nonetheless worthy of attention.
Whatever may be said in favor of a review, it is clear,
however, especially from its 1988 policy statement,136 that the
SEC is not intent on a total reassessment of its stance on insider
trading whether in the domestic or international context. It serves
the SEC's purposes to take for granted the necessity of insider
trading regulation in either context. It has been suggested that the
SEC's reluctance to encourage debate over the structure of
securities regulation in the United States, of which insider trading
such developing countries. The labor practices in issue cause indignation and loss
(economic and otherwise) to domestic workers and related interests. See Dani Rodrik,
Sense and Nonsense in the Globalization Debate, FOREIGN POLICY, Summer 1997, at 29-
30. Yet, aggressive, unilateral, extraterritorial action of the type undertaken by the SEC
in its insider trading crusade has not been a major component of the U.S. response so far.
Instead, worker retraining and redeployment have for instance been undertaken as major
responses to such externally generated impact.
134 Id.
135 See ROBERT REICH, THE WORK OF NATION: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 2 1sT
CENTURY CAPITALISM, ch. 25, especially at 306-11 (1991), where this approach is
explored in relation to the proper and most efficient attitude of states to contentious trade
issues in a globalized world. "History offers ample warning of how 'zero-sum'
nationalism-the assumption that either we win or they win---can corrode public values
to the point where citizens support policies that marginally improve their own welfare
while harming everyone else on the planet .. " Id. at 306.
136 Policy Statement, supra note 40.
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regulation is perhaps the most orchestrated aspect, is because it "is
generally perceived as a model regulatory agency and because
there has been no repeat of the economic conditions that led to the
adoption of the federal securities laws., 13 7  It appears then that
reinforced by public confidence in its work, the SEC has grown
somewhat insensitive to the pressures to which similar agencies
are usually amenable. A former SEC Commissioner bluntly
confessed that much, stating:
[T]he SEC's tradition of excellence and independence has made
it proud, but parochial. As a commissioner, I found that the
Commission's staff was hardworking and sincerely dedicated to
the public interest. However, staff members sometimes forgot
that they were public servants and lapsed into an arrogance that I
believe is intolerable in a democratic government. Further, the
agency too often failed to distinguish adequately between the
public interest and its institutional self-interest.1 38
Quite apart from this bureaucratic insensitivity, the agency's
behavior is perhaps better explained by public choice theory. This
posits that
[F]ar from seeking any independent conception of "public good"
regulators simply and rationally seek to maximize their own
level of external support, and thus frequently allocate wealth (in
137 Mahoney, supra note 44, at 305.
138 COX ET AL., supra note 86, at 14-15 (citing ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION (1981)). Concerning this kind of inner-directed, less-than-rational
bureaucratic behavior Donald C. Langevoort writes:
[Cilassic works such as Anthony Downs' Inside Bureaucracy [1967] maintain
that large organizations will over time inevitably begin to displace stated goals
with more self-serving institutional ones. Decisions made within the
bureaucracy come to reflect a cognitive content that, in the words of one author
who has studied the interplay between law and organization theory, is "the
product of widely dispersed informational sources and diffused individual
interests and attitudes, all mediated by structures, processes and chance in ways
that defy translating or tracing the organizational decision into its individual
sources." Loss of control extends even (perhaps especially) to those who are
supposed to be running the organization. Such diffusion of authority is the
source of institutional biases that value conservatism, risk avoidance, "turf
protection," and routine. Such behavior is especially pronounced in government
agencies, which lack the discipline imposed by a competitive marketplace, and
whose line personnel are protected from rapid replacement by civil service
regulations.
Langevoort, supra note 35, at 529.
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the form of regulatory subsidies and/or restraints on
competition) to those groups that bid the highest in terms of
such support.
1 39
Often these groups are the best organized and most effective
ones, able to pay sufficient "rent" for the subsidies/restraints, in
the form of support to the regulators. 4 ° These groups notably
include corporate managers, market professionals (i.e., investment
bankers, financial advisers),' 4' and securities lawyers. The first
two groups (especially the market professionals) benefit from
insider trading prohibition, as it enables them to profit from the
trade, semi-exclusively and far more substantially than would be
the case if it were not prohibited.4 2  Securities lawyers on the
other hand, benefit from interpreting and advising on the
139 Langevoort, supra note 35, at 528. Though the SEC has made recent proposals
for changes in insider trading rules, these have not involved any fundamental
reassessment of the need for and scope of insider trading regulation. Its recently
proposed Rule l0b-5-I merely enables a person who trades while in possession of
material non-public information to avoid liability by relying on four exceptions outlined
thereunder. Proposed Rule lOb-5-2, on the other hand, merely seeks to clarify the kind
of relationships that can ground liability for insider trading under the misappropriation
theory. This question seems to have arisen after the O'Hagan case, 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997), which accepted that a fiduciary relationship between the insider and a third party
who is not the issuer can be the basis of liability under the misappropriation theory. The
proposed rules are set out in Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act
Release No. 42259, at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-42259.htm (Dec. 20, 1999)
(on file with the North Carolina Journal of International Law & Commercial
Regulation).
140 Langevoort, supra note 35, at 528.
141 D. Haddock and J. R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest Model,
with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & EcON. 311,319 (1987).
142 With the prohibition, investment bankers have economies of scale advantages
over other groups, for example secretaries or office boys, who are almost as likely to
come across material non-public information. Given their ample resources, investment
bankers can exploit such information fully by trading secretly, in a way that the secretary
or worse still, an office boy with the same information might not, except with external
financial assistance. Yet obtaining such financial assistance is hardly possible in the
context of the trade's illegality. Also, even if the office boy can successfully execute a
small trade with personal resources, imprisonment upon conviction for the offense (as
distinct from disgorging the profits) is unfortunately not a function of the size of the
trade. Yet, the size of the trade and profits therefrom make a big difference in the
trader's ability to hire a good team of lawyers and take other actions to defend himself
against conviction and imprisonment. In the circumstances, the office boy may well be
disinclined towards taking the risk involved in trading, thus leaving the arena to the big
boys.
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mysterious theology of regulatory statutes and rules. 143 Anyone
viewing this analysis as largely theoretical should witness the
resistance of influential sections of the Bar to the repeal of
apparently otiose aspects of the insider trading laws.'"
B. Limitations on the Effectiveness of International
Regulation
"Of all black markets," wrote Manne, "the one in ideas and
knowledge is the most difficult to suppress."'' 45  This statement
underscores the difficulties inherent in regulating the
dissemination and use of information, which is at the core of
insider trading regulation, national or international. Having
transcended the question of whether insider trading should be
regulated, Congress realized this fact when it reduced the scope of
§ 16 of the Exchange Act as originally proposed.146 The section as
conceived had proscribed not just short-swing profits by insiders,
but more broadly, disclosure to others and profiting by third
parties to whom disclosure had been made. "Congress refused this
broad coverage on the grounds that enforcement of such a
provision was not feasible. Attention was thus focused on the so-
called statutory insiders-officers, directors, and beneficial
holders of 10 percent of an equity issue."'47  Subsequently,
however, the SEC, emboldened by the confidence reposed in it by
the legislature and the public, and aided by the courts, began to run
where angels feared to tread, following its promulgation of Rule
10b-5 and the subsequent cases prosecuted thereunder.
Focusing first on the domestic perspective, the major
impediments to effective insider trading regulation appear
bifurcated: first, insider trading is difficult to detect, and second, it
143 Langevoort, supra note 35, at 531.
144 See Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading: Part I." Reform
of Section 16, 42 Bus LAW. 1087, 1091-92 (1987). This task force of the American Bar
Association's Committee on the Federal Regulation of Securities opposed the repeal of §
16b which in the opinion of commentators had become a trap for the innocent, apart
from being irrelevant, given the development of Rule lOb-5. Its major recommendation
in this regard, was ultimately a shortening of the active period of the section's
prohibition from six months to three months. Id. at 1088.
145 MANNE, supra note 109, at 169.
146 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 556.
147 MANNE, supra note 109; see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 556.
[Vol. 27
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER TRADING
is costly to enforce.
1. Difficulty of Detection
Writing in 1966, Manne noted that the insider trading
prohibition in § 16 of the Exchange Act could easily be evaded
without detection, through shares held in street names, secret
accounts, accounts held in the names of relatives, and similar
devices. 148  He further stated that even such evasion was not
necessary, as liability could simply be avoided by the use of inside
information to trade in the shares of companies other than the
insider's. 149 Manne focused on insider trading under the relatively
limited provisions of § 16, apparently because Rule lOb-5 and
other paraphernalia of SEC regulation were not yet well
developed, if developed at all. 150  However, his analysis is still
valid even with regard to other provisions on insider trading in
their current configuration. That this is so is borne out by the
constant adjustments to insider trading laws initiated by the SEC
to reinforce the prohibition. 51 Some of these adjustments may be
said to be aimed not at detection, but rather at the better definition
(or rather description) of insider trading. 52  Yet there are others
directly related to the strengthening of detection. 53 Perhaps the
best example is the bounty program created for insider trading
informants under § 3 of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act (ITSFEA) of 1988.114 This promises informants
up to ten percent of insider trading profits, at the discretion of the
SEC. 55 The idea is to provide an incentive to make people come
forward with information on insider trading activities, which the
SEC cannot by itself discover. This desperate move underscores
148 MANNE, supra note 109.
1 Id. at 163-64.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1986).
153 It is still arguable that these are indirectly aimed at reinforcing detection, since a
re-definition or re-description of an offense may well be such as to give it characteristics
capable of easy detection. Indeed, this is clear from aspects of the SEC release
proposing new Rules lOb-5-1 and lOb-5-2, supra note 40.
154 See supra note 71.
155 Id.
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the fact that without independent information, the SEC by itself
often cannot ferret the evidence to set it on the track of an insider
trading transaction.
One may well ask whether there is anything so novel in this
approach as to make it indicative of any special investigative
difficulties on the part of the SEC. After all, the police offer
bounties routinely to informants in murder and other cases. The
answer would be that the novelty lies not in the fact of the bounty
itself, but the way in which it is applied. Here, the bounty is
offered not for a specific incidence of crime and over a definite
period 156 as the police are wont to do, but for a class of activities
on an indefinite basis. The inference, then, is that the special
investigative difficulties which usually impel the police to offer
bounties on occasions is a characteristic feature of this class of
activities covered by the SEC bounty. Furthermore, in most cases,
police investigation is initiated at the instance of an affected or
aggrieved party. This obviates the need for the police to go in
search of the initial leads independently. By contrast, the SEC
cannot depend on such initiation, since the victims of insider
trading in the public markets are not easily identifiable, and
grievances of the type common with the usual crimes are not a
normal feature of insider trading. It must depend on informants
who often do not feel as deep a compulsion to report suspected
insider trading cases as would normally be the case for police
crimes. Its prospects are enhanced when the informant is a self-
regulatory organization like the exchange on which the trade is
effected, or some other institution operating in the securities
market, even though they also act on their own impetus.'57
Perhaps a corollary of the difficulty of detecting insider trading
activities is the fact that the deterrent effect of insider trading
sanctions is very limited. The steady increase in insider trading
penalties, starting with the amendment of § 32 of the Exchange
Act in 1975 to increase the maximum fine and prison term to
156 For example, bounties can be offered from the beginning of investigations to the
arraignment of a suspect.
157 Thomas, supra note 39, at 110-11. In Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
(1987), the SEC investigations and prosecutions were the result of initial inquiries
instituted at the brokerage firm of Kidder Peabody, where correlations between Winans'
column in the Wall Street Journal and the trading activities of his fellow conspirators at
the brokerage firm were first noted. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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$10,000 and five years respectively, has been noted' and
juxtaposed with the increased prosecutions of the 1980s which
were marked by the Chiarella decision. 59 Empirical analysis was
carried out, using data from the National Archives on insider
transactions in publicly held firms.16° The study covered only
insiders' open market sales and purchases within a fourteen-year
period from 1975 to 1989.161 It examined gains from such trading,
anchoring the identification of insider trading on the statistical
significance of gross abnormal profits from the transaction.
162
From the analysis, the volume of insider trading activities showed
no decline in the periods after major increases in penalties. 63
Trading continued as before without even a temporary decline.164
It is well known in criminal jurisprudence that when the chances
of detection are slim, the penalties for a crime are ordinarily
heightened to compensate for the reduced probability of detection.
Drafters of corporate and securities codes have not overlooked this
principle. 165 The SEC, through the increases in penalties, therefore
implicitly acknowledges the difficulties of detecting violators of
the insider trading prohibition and enforcing the law against them.
The difference, however, lies in the optimism it shares that the
activity is being or can nevertheless be effectively checked, quite
unlike other schools of thought.
2. Cost of Enforcement
The cost of enforcing the insider trading prohibition may be
separated into two categories. The first category would be those
costs which are incurred ab initio and directly in the course of
enforcement. The second would be those costs which are incurred
158 H. Nejat Seyhun, The Effectiveness of the Insider-Trading Sanctions, 35 J.L. &
EcON. 149, 152-53 (1992).
159 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
160 Seyhun, supra note 158.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 156-60.
163 Id. at 157-58, 169-71.
164 Id. at 169-71. The analysis showed, however, that concerning two specific areas
of potential insider trading, takeovers and earnings announcements, court cases against
insider traders had a deterrent effect, especially on top executives. Id. at 176-77.
165 See, e.g., Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of
Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1911, 1934-35 (1996).
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ex post, as a fallout of enforcement. The former naturally includes
the funds budgeted for enforcement activities, while the latter
includes the sometimes unanticipated fallouts of enforcement,
such as the violation of citizens' right of privacy in order to
facilitate investigation. 66  In this regard, the major questions
become whether the SEC can afford to fund enforcement to the
degree that it would wish and whether society can afford some of
the certain consequences of enforcement. 167 Put differently, how
far can available resources take insider trading regulation and
enforcement, and how much of its fallouts are tolerable given that
the benefits are not undisputed? Regarding funds, the SEC
obviously has the constraints that every agency has in managing
finite resources. So, theirs is not an infinite capacity to fund
investigation to whatever extent is desired. The fact, for instance,
that the payment of the bounty promised informants is made
conditional on the SEC's own discretion, shows that it anticipates
a possible run on its resources if free reign is given. The
constraints on resources have been captured by a writer in the
following terms:
[F]ighting insider trading involves significant SEC resources.
The already overworked SEC spends part of its annual one
hundred thirty-five million dollar budget enforcing prohibitions
against such trading. Due to the SEC's limited resources, there
is a significant opportunity cost incurred when the SEC
personnel are redirected away from other SEC functions such as
reviewing registration applications for new issue ... Aside from
litigating "some splashy securities-fraud cases," the SEC has
had trouble keeping up with its other less glamorous duties. In
the last ten years, the SEC has been unable to thoroughly
examine registration statements, thus compromising the purpose
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. As long as the SEC concentrates on
policing insider trading there will be a question whether it can
determine "when its enforcement efforts are costing more than
166 The latter costs are likely to be more substantial. Such costs include the cost of
private compliance with insider trading regulations and deterrence to market participants
resulting from inconsistent prosecution of insider trading under ambiguous statutes and
cases.
167 "Certain consequences" mean those that are less likely to be disputed, as
opposed to those likely to cause debate, like the claim that the prohibition is allocatively
inefficient. A certain consequence would be, for instance, the deterrence to market
participants resulting from inconsistent prosecution.
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they are worth."' 168
The foregoing indicates that enforcement is selective, as a
direct result of funding constraints. While it is arguable that the
same cost problem besets the enforcement of other crimes, the
case for insider trading is worsened by the doubts about the need
for its prohibition in the first place. Such doubts do not exist about
stealing and driving while drunk, for example.
Funds aside, the public may however be inclined toward
accommodating the other costs of enforcement, given the
influence that the SEC wields and the fact that the virtues and
values of the insider trading crusade have become internalized in
many citizens, who hardly would question it. Yet, as a matter of
logic, there is a limit beyond which peoples' tolerance would
wane. As Manne wrote in relation to his review of the possibility
of using police-state tactics to check insider trading effectively,
[a] much more important objection however, is that such police
state tactics are simply intolerable. Spying on social meetings,
computerized friendships, total disclosure of all financial affairs
and decisions, the necessity to explain every profit-these are
unthinkable in a civilized democracy. The costs, financially,
morally, and politically, are too great, and we should never
anticipate truly effective policing of insider trading by trying to
ferret out every proscribed transaction as it occurs. 1
6 9
Difficulty of detection and the associated costs appear to be the
primary limitations on the SEC's enforcement of the insider
trading prohibition. Being rather basic in character, in the sense
that they are likely to be replicated in any other jurisdiction, the
relative rarity of these limitations reflects the fact that the
prohibition against insider trading has a relatively firm footing in
the United States.
168 Francis Christian DiRuso, Note, The Battle Against Insider Trading: Are We
Paying Too High a Price for Too Little Gain? 14 VT. L. REV. 457, 493 (1990). In 1999
and 2000 the SEC budget was about $356 million and $377 million, respectively. The
projection for 2001 is an appropriation of $423 million. See U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, SEC Annual Report at tbl. 25 (Sept. 30, 1999)
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep99/appxb.pdf. See also E-mail from Bill Wiggins, Office
of the Executive Director, Securities and Exchange Commission, to George Nnona,
Graduate Fellow, Harvard Law School (Oct. 30, 2000) (on file with author).
169 MANNE, supra note 109, at 165-66.
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3. Difficulty of Detection and Enforcement Costs on the
International Plane
How do these two limitations play out in relation to the
international regulation of insider trading? First consider the
difficulty of detection. How detectable is cross-border insider
trading in which the interests of the United States or its investors
are implicated in any of the ways that worry the SEC, given its
broad conception of such interests?17 ° Under such a conception,
for instance, insider trading effected on the Tokyo stock exchange
in Japanese yen by a Japanese national on the securities of a
Japanese firm, would be recognized as having a negative impact
on U.S. investors, to the extent that the same securities are traded
on a U.S. exchange or over the counter (OTC) market. Taken a
step further, it may even be argued that even if not listed on a U.S.
exchange or an OTC market, the interests of the United States and
its investors are implicated to the extent that a U.S. investor deals
contemporaneously on the Japanese exchange in the same
securities as the Japanese insider. That U.S. interests are
implicated, especially in the former scenario can hardly be in
dispute, given the activities of arbitrageurs and other links that
make the financial markets interconnected.
What is in doubt, however, is the chance that the activities of
the Japanese trader will be detected. First, impediments similar to
those noted above in the detection of domestic insider trading
apply, these being a function of the intrinsic character of the
insider trading prohibition as a ban on the use of ideas and
information. Second, other factors peculiar to the foreign
jurisdiction, in this case Japan, supervene. In Japan, detection in
the circumstances is highly unlikely, given cultural peculiarities.
It is a widely acknowledged fact that the Japanese see nothing
wrong with insider trading. 7' In fact, tipping inside information is
for them is a time-honored means of cementing business
relationships. 172 Admittedly, one of the elements of the Japanese
"Big Bang" reforms of 1996 is "active punishment for violations
of rules."' 73 However, this is likely to make a difference only in
170 Kehoe, supra note 75, at 374.
171 Id. at 355.
172 Id.
173 ScoTr & WELLONS, supra note 39, at 8-69.
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the enforcement efforts of the Japanese regulators, which has
indeed become heightened generally. Changing the established
beliefs and market habits of the average Japanese investor is a
more intractable problem. Yet, this is the most essential factor in
the effective prohibition and policing of insider trading. An
attitude similar to the Japanese's is also noticeable in other
jurisdictions, such as Germany. This is notwithstanding the
proscription of insider trading since the Second Financial Market
Promotion Act, passed in 1994. The established habit of German
insiders to pass material information to relatives and friends is a
more difficult problem to solve. 17
4
Under the circumstances, the major means upon which a
regulatory agency like the SEC relies for the identification of a
violation, namely independent reports of suspicious trading,
becomes even further circumscribed and largely unavailable, as
people see no need to make any such reports. Indeed, even a
bounty program like that initiated by the SEC under the ITSFEA
of 1988 is unlikely to help much in this scenario, as the
community, seeing no harm in the proscribed activity, is likely to
frown on such a report. Anyone who has lived in a traditional
society like Japan, which tends towards strong communal ties with
subterranean codes of honor operating in ways that sometimes
oppose and dominate formal and more apparent laws, would
realize the difficulties of detecting an activity like insider trading,
which the people feel is merely mala in prohibitum and not mala
in se.
The foregoing scenario involves a developed market and a
variant of insider trading that is perhaps relatively easy to detect,
since a professional trader is quite a conspicuous player in the
market. The possibilities of detection become more dismal if we
take a hypothetical removed from this. Assume for instance the
same securities in the above scenarios, but that the securities are
those of a mining corporation with operations in several
developing countries by way of subsidiaries that are closely-held
companies. On the board of directors of one of these subsidiaries
174 See Standen, supra note 28, at 177, who writes: "German banks and major
corporations have long been accustomed to passing on inside information to select
groups of analysts and journalists via their legendary 'fireside chats.' Moreover, there is
little sign of any real desire on the part of 'insiders' to change this rather cozy
arrangement." Id.
2001]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
sits a local chieftain, who is a director by virtue of a minority
shareholding in the subsidiary. At the last directors' meeting in
every financial year, the chief executive officer of the subsidiary
briefs the directors about the earnings outlook for the next year.
Occasionally, he gives facts and figures indicating new discoveries
and planned market developments. Because it is as yet for
purposes of internal planning, and due to other strategic reasons,
this information is not released to the public. These facts and
figures, from previous experience, are certain to affect the parent
company's stock whenever released to the public. The local
chieftain typically trades in the parent company's stock on a
Japanese stock exchange, using such information. He also trades
on the stock of the U.S. parent company's competitors with such
information. As an experienced investor, he avoids trading in such
quantities as will lead to a jump in the prices of the securities. All
this he does immediately, a year or more ahead of the time the
subsidiary's projections are made public. What are the chances of
detection under these circumstances? He is not a conspicuous
market participant or trader. He has effected his transactions using
inside information well ahead of the hullabaloo that will ultimately
attend the announcement of the information to the market. He has
traded in a market (Japan) relatively removed from the prying eyes
of the U.S. market participants. The chances of detection appear
rather slim. They become even slimmer if the chieftain tips some
other party totally unconnected with the corporation, who then
trades immediately on the information. Variants of this scenario
can be replicated all over the world, and most people who have
had close dealings with the boards of subsidiaries of multinational
corporations in developing countries and emerging economies
know how real and common the situation is.
Money managers now circumvent the exchanges, using
automated electronic trading systems to trade in securities off the
board. Sometimes they simply trade directly among themselves.
"This development is causing alarm on Wall Street and in other
financial centers as large volume institutional traders, in particular,
seek to minimize transaction costs." '175 How does the SEC, or any
other regulatory agency for that matter, detect insider trading off
the exchange when the parties to the transaction, as is the case in
175 Millspaugh, supra note 82, at 361.
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many jurisdictions, see nothing wrong in such a practice, taking it
as an expected risk of trading? None of these parties certainly has
any incentive to report such transactions, more so in the long run,
when every party would most likely have had a chance or two of
trading with inside information. As the world increasingly takes
to the Internet, the opportunity for such transactions multiplies in a
way that will strain the capacity of an SEC intent on detecting
insider trading, wherever and by whomever undertaken, once U.S.
interests are implicated. The statement of Choi and Guzman,
made in the more general context of securities offerings is
apposite:
[E]fforts to regulate all transactions that impact the American
market regardless of where they occur potentially lead to a
policy subjecting any securities transaction in the world to U.S.
law .... The problem is dramatically demonstrated by what is
sure to become an important venue for trading in securities, the
Internet. Although the position of the United States towards
trading on the Internet is still being developed, its current
jurisdictional approach is expansive. The United States appears
to believe that its jurisdiction should be asserted over any offer
made on the Internet that is transmitted to the United States.
Given that the offeror does not control the location of those who
visit the offeror's web pages, any Internet offering may become
subject to the laws of the United States, regardless of the
offeror' s intent.1
76
If insider trading is conducted in the course of such a securities
offering, detection will be a major problem for the SEC unless the
proprietor of the site does not wish to conceal information
pertaining to such trading. Yet concealment of such information
and a generally less restrictive and cheaper transactional
environment are potential selling points for such Internet sites.
This is more so if the international or regional markets demand for
such. It may not be too far fetched to imagine a web site that
advertises openly that insider trading thereon is permitted. 177 The
176 Choi & Guzman, supra note 48, at 914-15.
177 One may be tempted to ask why anyone would be interested in trading systems
that permit insider trading. It should be noted that stock traded on such systems will be
discounted for its higher risk, implying higher returns when such risks do not
materialize. There should also be savings that flow from lower regulatory costs on such
systems. If there are, as may be expected, restrictions on the sale of such "insider-
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task of scouring the Internet to locate sites where such trading
occurs will undoubtedly prove a daunting one, given the ease and
speed with which sites can be replicated and the limitlessness of
the medium. Some sites may even be established and operated by
a closed circle of people, for the purpose of trading exclusively
among themselves, with no advertisement to the general public.
The difficulties that such trading will pose in terms of detection
are captured in the words of a Harvard Law School Web Systems
Administrator:
If a site is not indexed by the major search engines & [sic]
directories (i.e., Alta Vista, Yahoo, etc.) and there are no links to
it from other sites, there's no way to know it even exists, let
alone index it. So a comprehensive directory of all web pages
on the Internet would be technically unfeasible. And even if
such a thing were possible, the fast pace of changes to Web sites
would make such a directory obsolete before it could even be
fully compiled. 78
traded" stock on other exchanges or systems, then all other things being equal, we have a
unique mix that should attract those interested in diversification, hedging, or simply
higher returns for higher risks. More generally, such systems are likely to be primarily
targeted at specific communities whose ethos accommodates such trading. Patronage by
those from outside such communities would be possible, but only incidental to the
calculus of those who establish such trading systems.
178 E-mail interview with Mary Ellen Nagle, Web Systems Administrator/Analyst,
Harvard Law School Information Technology Services (ITS) Systems (Feb. 25-26,
1999).
One may be inclined to think that such sites would not receive many or even any
visitors, since they are not indexed by the major search engines. The reality, however, is
that such sites, as mentioned in note 177 above, will usually be primarily for trading
among members of specific communities or regions, much in the same way that
hundreds of little-known Internet Service Providers (ISP) currently provide web access
to consumers in different parts of the world. Because they are not America Online
(AOL) or other established names in the business, few persons outside their communities
or regions know about these ISPs. Advertisements in local newspapers and a mailing list
are used to establish awareness about the ISP or Internet site within a community.
Outsiders, including U.S. citizens, would occasionally stumble upon such sites and trade
thereon. Stock thereon may even be dollar-denominated. Perhaps several months or
years after it is set up, the SEC eventually would become aware of its existence, and
move against it. The site is re-established weeks later, and mailing lists and phone calls
are used to recreate awareness. Ultimately, trying to stop such a site could become like
an attempt to capture a guerilla radio station in mountainous territory. The peaks make
tracking more difficult, and when tracked, the terrain makes rapid movement difficult.
Meanwhile, by their very nature, guerilla broadcasters and their equipment are constantly
on the move.
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The implementation of the SEC's global policy on insider
trading will therefore, as far as detection is concerned, be
significantly impeded by the lack of initial leads that are so critical
to commencement of investigations. The same goes for any other
foreign regulatory agency that is inclined toward assisting the SEC
in its detection efforts. Such leads will not be forthcoming, to the
extent that insider trading is not viewed negatively by the public in
other jurisdictions, but is in fact viewed positively. The SEC will
therefore have to be content with those transactions effected on
U.S. exchanges or the OTC market (subject to the fact that
detection is even in this context intrinsically circumscribed as
previously explained), and reports from the occasional citizen who
is unhappy with his transactions on a non-U.S. exchange or other
extraterritorial fora like the Internet.
The issue of costs naturally follows, in the context of the
extensive efforts that must attend, and consequences that will be
entailed by, the detection (and enforcement) efforts of the SEC at
the global level. What will be the costs of such global efforts and
how will they be borne? Considering the resource aspect of costs,
it is clear that the SEC can ill afford to fund the global detection
and investigation of insider trading in such a manner and on such a
scale as to effectively extirpate or meaningfully control it, even
assuming that such detection and investigation are feasible.
Costs were for instance a major concern in the debate
preceding the ITSFEA, which by § 6 thereof empowered the SEC
to give investigatory assistance to foreign securities authorities
conducting investigations over the violations of their securities
laws. Many people concerned about the additional cost to the
SEC, pointed out that U.S. budgetary constraints may make the
implementation of the provision unfeasible."7 9 Not surprisingly
therefore, the authority of the SEC to receive compensation for
expenses incurred on behalf of foreign governments was a feature
of the subsequent ISECA when the bill was proposed. 180 Those
opposed to the SEC's willingness to bear these costs clearly
labored under the notion that the SEC was in so doing, granting
the foreign securities agencies a favor, especially given that
179 Thomas, supra note 39, at 121.
180 Id. at 127.
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reciprocity was not a condition for such assistance. 8' However,
the scheme properly viewed, was an exercise in self-help. The
then SEC chairman, David Ruder in his testimony before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee, defended the non-
reciprocity of the provision on the ground that the SEC might
nevertheless, desire to aid a foreign agency in a situation in which
the SEC needs to protect directly threatened U.S. interests, and in
a situation in which the SEC wants by means of such assistance, to
encourage future cooperation from the foreign agency. 18 2
Effectively therefore, when the SEC aids such investigations, it
would in many cases be because of ancillary benefits it hopes to
derive from such help. It follows that to some extent the cost of
such investigations are properly its own cost, and not that of the
foreign agency, and that in trying to shift it, the SEC seeks a
subsidy of its own enforcement activities.
If the SEC is facing budgetary constraints for its insider
trading crusade, the constraints on regulatory agencies of less
endowed nations can only be imagined. Even if such agencies
detect and are willing to investigate insider trading, the facilities
for such investigation may be inadequate or simply lacking. This
is more likely to be the case in the emerging markets and
developing countries, where societies face problems that are
considered far more basic and deserving of resources than the
elimination of insider trading. For such places the SEC must be
willing to go beyond measures like the MOU or the exportation of
insider trading laws, and be able to back it up with funding and
other forms of technical assistance. Otherwise, it may have to be
content with selective prosecution of a few splashy cases
originating from such jurisdictions, leaving the mainstream of
insider trading unrestrained. A good example is Nigeria, where,
by rules made pursuant to the erstwhile Securities and Exchange
Commission Decree of 1988,183 the Nigerian Securities and
181 Id.
182 Id. at 18 (citing "Ruder Says SEC Should Have Flexibility in Assisting Foreign
Securities Agencies," 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, at 1236 (Aug. 5,1988)).
183 See Chapter 406, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Although the impetus
for the promulgation of the Rules is not clear, one notes that it occurred in the 1980s,
when the anti-insider trading campaign of the SEC became heightened with major
investigations and prosecutions internationally. On the other hand, the more recent
insider trading provisions under the 1990 Companies and Allied Matters Decree are
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Exchange Commission established an anti-insider trading regime
in terms similar to the U.S. regulations. No case has, however,
been instituted under these rules to date. In 1990, the rules were
apparently reinforced by the prohibition of insider trading in Part
XVII, Section 614-621, of the Companies and Allied Matters
Decree of that year, but this has made no difference.
8 4
Meanwhile, the Nigerian government has since 1995 pursued an
economic liberalization policy, an aspect of which is the
internationalization of the securities market. 8 5  In fact, the
Nigerian Stock Exchange in September of that year, released the
"Guidelines for Foreign Investment Through the Nigerian Stock
Exchange," spelling out relevant details. The effect of this is to
open the capital markets for investments by foreigners either
more likely a result of the efforts of some academics who genuinely believed that insider
trading was unfair and indeed "evil," and whose views proved influential with the
Nigerian Law Reform Commission at the consultative stages of decree making. See
infra note 184. In sharp contrast, the only stock exchange then, the Lagos Stock
Exchange, also known as the Nigerian Stock Exchange, did not favor the regulation of
insider trading on a standing basis. It preferred instead the ad hoc intervention of the
Finance Minister if and whenever the need arose; which occasion is unlikely to involve
routine insider trading cases. (It should be noted that at the time of the consultations
concerning the 1990 Decree, the Rules of the Nigerian SEC were yet to take effect, as
they were undergoing review by the Justice Ministry.) See THE NIGERIAN LAW REFORM
COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS ON THE REFORM OF NIGERIAN COMPANY LAW, VOL. I
(REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS) PART TWO, paras. 155-163, especially para. 160
(1987).
184 Nigeria's capital market laws and regulations were recently revised and codified
by the Securities and Investments Act of 1999. Part XVII of the Companies and Allied
Matters Decree 1990 was repealed by section 263(l)(d) of this Act, its provisions being
embodied effectively in scattered parts of the Act. Part VII of the Act now deals with the
registration of securities, while Part X thereof deals with trading in securities, including
insider trading. (A careful reader of the Act would note the misidentification of Part X
'Trading in Securities' as Part IX in the arrangement of sections.) See Foreign
Investment Requirements and Protections: Foreign Investment Requirements, at
http://www.nipc-nigeria.org/fir.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
185 See, for instance, section 26 of the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and
Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 17 of 1995, which was one of the statutes that
launched this initiative by permitting anyone, irrespective of citizenship or residence, to
invest in the Nigerian capital market. Other provisions of the Decree allow for free
importation and exportation of funds through normal banking channels. See Foreign
Investment Requirements and Protections: Foreign Investment Requirements, at
http://www.nipc-nigeria.org/fir.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation).
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publicly or by way of private placements. Beyond these the
government in February 1999 announced the privatization of
thirty-seven major enterprises including those in the key sectors of
telecommunications and energy.'86 Major U.S. and international
bankers and financial institutions were appointed as consultants to
these enterprises for this purpose, 187 evincing a desire on the
government's part to earn scarce foreign exchange through the
sale of these enterprises' securities abroad, as was successfully
done in neighboring Ghana with Ashanti Goldfields Company
(listed on the New York Stock Exchange) and related
establishments. If the securities of these privatized enterprises are
traded simultaneously on Nigerian and international exchanges, or
even exclusively on the latter, they are likely to be the subject of
insider trading in the manner to which players in the Nigerian
securities market have become accustomed. Even if not traded on
U.S. exchanges, the chances that they will attract the attention of
U.S. investors cannot be ruled out.188 The SEC will certainly need
nothing less than the establishment of a Nigerian branch office in
order to police the magnitude of insider trading that is likely to
occur in relation to U.S. investors and interests. Given that this is
impermissible, its leeway would be to fund and otherwise aid its
financially anemic Nigerian counterpart. Its ability to fund such a
venture in the long run is, however, doubtful.
Funds and resources aside, to what extent is the international
community willing to bear the costs of insider trading regulation in
the form of the fallouts which the average U.S. citizen is apt to
tolerate? Will the Swiss as individuals tolerate violations of the
age-long privacy of bank accounts, if the demands of insider
trading go beyond the current trend towards violating the privacy
of foreigners' accounts in their banks and begins to affect accounts
held by the Swiss themselves? Will it be tolerated if it begins to
have an overall negative effect on their banking industry? Without
the kind of public outrage that greets insider trading violations in
the United States, how long will market participants in other
jurisdictions tolerate routine questioning of large sales or
186 VANGUARD NEWSPAPERS, issues 20-23, Feb. 1999.
187 These include Merrill Lynch International, First Boston, Credit Suisse, Salomon
Smith Barney, Citibank, Warburg Dellon Read, and Arthur Andersen International.
188 Traditionally, the yield from the Nigerian stock market has been attractive.
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purchases each time a stock shows a substantial movement in price
or other statistics? And how long will the society tolerate the
deterrence to market participants resulting from inconsistent
prosecution of insider trading activities under broad, ambiguous
statutes and cases?
Manne's statement'89 regarding the potentials of police-state
tactics in the detection of insider trading readily comes to mind
here. This is because the longer one looks at the matter the more
plausible it becomes that, short of such tactics, detection of insider
trading will be practically impossible outside the United States, in
those places where information relevant to detection will not
readily be forthcoming from the public. Yet these are the places
where such tactics are least likely to be tolerated for the sake of
insider trading detection. Assailing long-established bank secrecy
laws in other jurisdictions, as the SEC has tended to do, obviously
smacks somewhat of such tactics. The resistance that has greeted
such moves, even at the official level in these jurisdictions,' 90
albeit often subtle and covert, is instructive. Therefore,
notwithstanding their entry into MOUs or similar arrangements
with the SEC (a fact they can hardly often resist given the
importance of the U.S. markets) these jurisdictions at best have a
lukewarm attitude towards insider trading regulation, and this will
in the long run prove an insurmountable obstacle for its
meaningful regulation globally.
This discussion of the fallout costs of detecting insider trading
internationally, is closely related to the more general issue of
effective enforcement. Conceptually, the difference may be
simply stated: Detection comes before enforcement, of which
investigation may be said to be an aspect. The linkage, however,
is that many of the factors which impede detection will also often
impede enforcement. A further distinction lies in the intensity of
the impediments presented by these factors which, in the
international context, is likely to be higher at the enforcement
stage. Conversely, this stage would present almost no problems
for the SEC on the domestic scene since, following the detection
of a domestic violation, very few impediments would constrain
enforcement efforts, except perhaps a paucity of resources.
189 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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So, how does international enforcement fare with factors such
as funding constraints and cultural bias against insider trading
regulation? The issue of funds can be summarily dispatched by
noting that the SEC's funding constraints and those of the less-
endowed agencies in other jurisdictions can only be more acute at
this stage. The stage would often involve expensive litigation
undertaken in foreign jurisdictions, some of which run less-than-
ideal judicial systems, to enforce violations affecting U.S. interests
as broadly conceived by the SEC. Even if an extradition treaty
exists, it would also usually involve litigation in the foreign
jurisdiction to determine the propriety of a violator's extradition in
each case. Assuming all cases detected are prosecuted and
decided in favor of the agency, the expense that would be
involved, given what would be the number of violators in the
various markets, is mind-boggling.
Regarding cultural bias against (or indifference towards)
insider trading regulation, we may revisit the hypothetical of the
local chieftain given previously. Assuming that his transactions
are eventually detected, what are the chances of prosecution,
leading to conviction or extradition? To start with, the decision to
prosecute him will be a very political one, because irrespective of
the government's objectivity concerning the propriety of
prosecuting him, the government would nevertheless be wary of a
political backlash resulting from public perception that the
chieftain is merely being persecuted for no good reason. Very
likely, he will not be prosecuted. Even if ultimately prosecuted,
the chances of punishment ultimately are low. Judges everywhere
are members of a community, who share in the ethos of the
community. In cases of this nature where society perceives
nothing wrong in a proscribed activity, a judge is likely ab initio to
be under considerable self-pressure not to convict, and if she
convicts, not to punish. For this purpose, it is noteworthy that in
most jurisdictions outside the United States, the jury system is not
used. The magistrate or judge sitting alone at first instance,
decides questions of fact and law. And if the judge does punish
the "offender," the punishment may invoke further public outcry
and a call for executive intervention through the exercise of the
prerogative of mercy, or similar fiat that permit government to
pardon convicted persons. Prosecution for insider trading in the
circumstances, is likely to attract the same attention and outcry as
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prosecutions for bigamy in several jurisdictions where, as a
colonial legacy, the western notion of monogamy was statutorily
but unsuccessfully superimposed on the age-long polygamous
conception of marriage.
It is quite instructive in this connection, to note the public
support received by Franz Steinkuhler, a prominent German labor
leader and member of the supervisory board of Daimler-Benz AG,
who in 1993 traded with inside information on the stock of an
affiliated company.1 9 "Public support for Steinkuhler remained
considerable, however, and Steinkuhler himself, while confirming
that he had engaged in the trading, admitted no wrongdoing,
dismissing the charges as 'attempts to discredit my person.""
'9 92
While cases involving chieftains and other personages will almost
certainly attract public attention, there is nothing indicating that
cases involving less popular figures will not similarly be opposed
if prosecution becomes extensive.
The point here is that insider trading is a long way from being
admitted into the hallowed class of crimes jure gentium, which by
the operation of jus cogens (custom or usage) in public
international law have become globally accepted as reprehensible,
and have therefore been effectively criminalized internationally.
Only a few crimes like enslavement, piracy, and lately, genocide
fall into this pedigree. Until insider trading comes within or
approximates this class, enforcement in the manner and scale
necessarily entailed by the SEC approach will remain a phantasm.
Incidentally, many commentators realize, at least on a general
level, the difficulties which beset international enforcement efforts
of the SEC. For instance, it has been written that the "lack of
consensus on insider trading, procedural obstacles and difficulty
enforcing sanctions impede international enforcement of insider
trading prohibitions. When other countries do not consider insider
trading a crime or a violation of a civil duty, they resist
cooperating with American enforcement officials.' 93 In fact,
[m]any foreign states view any effort to apply U.S. laws beyond
U.S. borders as a violation of the foreign state's sovereignty and
191 Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms Sweep Across Germany:
Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177, 178 (1995).
192 Id.
193 Ruiz, supra note 86.
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as an improper effort to export American economic, social, and
judicial values. Historically, the U.S has attempted to enforce
domestic law prohibiting insider trading internationally in spite
of the extraterritorial jurisdiction problems and the conflicts with
principles of international law and comity that this policy
creates." 1
94
The defect in many of these analyses is, however, that they see
the problem as principally a result of the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, and from this go on to assume,
erroneously, that once the other countries amend their laws and
enter into well structured MOUs or similar bilateral or multilateral
arrangements, the enforcement problems will largely become
amenable to solution. 95 Others seem to assume that while such
adjustments are laudable, the efforts of the SEC will pay off in the
long run, even if the traditional jurisdictional approaches are used,
perhaps with some strengthening.1 96  But, as has been shown
above, to transcend the objections of states and get them, perhaps
unwillingly, to promulgate anti-insider trading laws, is to scratch
the surface of the problem. The realities on the ground in many
jurisdictions mean that enforcement, even with the close
supervision and assistance of the SEC, will often meet with
substantial resistance.
Indeed, also implicit in some of the analyses is an assumption
that the threat of insider trading is one that emanates largely from
the major financial markets with which the SEC has had to deal so
far. (On this assumption it is easier to imagine that given the more
structured nature of these societies, the international obligations
assumed under MOUs or like arrangements will readily be
translated into effective enforcement efforts. Experience has of
course not shown this to be always true, especially when the
authorities in these countries bow to pressure in acceding to such
arrangements.) There is however conceptually little to stop such
194 Id.
195 See generally Manning Gilbert Warren, The Regulation of Insider Trading in the
European Community, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1037 (1991); Brooslin, supra note 54, at
397.
196 See Pitt et al., supra note 46, at 375; Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro,
Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON
REG. 149 (1990); Thomas, supra note 39.
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insider trading from being initiated in say, Nepal.' 97 When such
countries are involved resistance to enforcement may come in
unexpected ways, unless a proscribed activity is in line with the
society's ethos, or the incidence of enforcement is minimal and
therefore insignificant and inconspicuous-hardly the kind that
will accord with the SEC's desire for a comprehensive check on
insider trading.
Given that the exportation of anti-insider trading laws based on
the U.S. model is a major approach adopted by the SEC it would
be worthwhile to examine at this stage how such laws might in the
long run assist the campaign against insider trading. For this
purpose, assume that there is no resistance in the foreign country
against moves to sanction insider trading, and that such activities
are detected and routinely prosecuted in the courts, with no need to
extradite the offenders to the United States for prosecution in U.S.
courts. Will this have the effect desired by the SEC? In other
words, barring the logistics of detection and enforcement, how
would insider trading cases fare in non-U.S. courts operating U.S.
insider trading laws or variants thereof?
The bulwark of U.S. insider trading regulation is Rule lOb-5, a
provision largely nurtured to maturity by the judiciary. In this
connection, it has been described as a "judicial oak that has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn,"'98 a description which
for Loss and Seligman "falls short, if anything, of describing one
of the most dramatic examples in the entire American corpus juris
of the growth of law through the interaction of the legislative,
administrative, and judicial processes."' 199  Against this
background, a major problem with a meaningful and effective
exportation of insider trading regulation, is that Rule lOb-5 has
largely developed through judicial activism of a sort that is
peculiar to the United States and can only be sustained in the
context of the country's constitutional framework. This
197 Incidentally, the government of Nepal is currently exploring the possibilities of
establishing the country as an international financial center. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION BROCHURE, PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
(1998) (giving details of the Nepalese initiative which is being undertaken with the
technical cooperation of the Program). This, in a general sense, makes the prospect of
insider trading from such a jurisdiction less remote.
198 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1995).
199 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 818.
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framework has effectively accepted judges as equal participants in
the political process, with power to make (and indeed unmake)
laws through the judicial process. This feature is appropriately
captured by Abram Chayes when he writes that
[t]he judicial department established by the framers was unique
among nations in 1787 and, to a large extent, remains unique
today. All modem societies have judges, and an independent
judiciary is a hallmark of liberal democracy. In other countries,
however, the judicial system is regarded primarily as a service
provided by the government, much like education ... with the
workaday function of resolving the disputes that arise in the
ordinary course of social and economic life. The courts in such
societies are, of course, essential organs. Unlike the judicial
branch brought to life by article III, [of the constitution]
however, they are not thought to be, nor are they in fact,
engaged in the political process.
2°°
Rule lOb-5 in its current configuration is a product of judicial
lawmaking-an emanation of judicial participation in the political
process. A related factor is the unusually extensive discretionary
power wielded by judges, perhaps as a corollary of the U.S. legal
system's emphasis on standards rather than bright-line rules.20 1 It
is this peculiar milieu that has enabled the U.S. judiciary to grow
Rule lOb-5 from a little acorn into an oak, and to keep it from
becoming stunted, despite occasional trimmings at the edges.
Primary corporate insiders like directors and officers are
relatively easy to police since they generally operate in the
limelight and the restrictions attaching to their status become
readily well defined, from constant exposure to adjudication. The
more difficult aspects of insider trading regulation lie in the
remote penumbra where tippers, tippees, and a chain of other
affiliates descended from them operate. Here, nothing less than
the activism of the judiciary in the peculiar American context can
achieve the kind of results attained so far. And, it is precisely in
these areas that other legal systems will fail the SEC, by not
developing at all or developing differently, thereby leading to
either non-regulation of this penumbra or regulation that is
200 See Abram Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1026. 1028 (1988).
201 Id.
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different in scope and effect from that sought by the SEC. The
whole corpus of insider trading regulation (as distinct from market
manipulation 212) is no less an American invention than the
common law itself is English in origin. It requires power and
passion of a kind lacking in the judiciaries of other jurisdictions, to
effectively replicate it in form and effect outside the United States.
Along this line, it is highly unlikely for instance, that the
misappropriation theory, which has found favor with many U.S.
lower courts, and lately with the Supreme Court,213 would ever
receive the imprimatur of non-U.S. courts as a means of extending
liability under Rule lOb-5 to capture hitherto uncovered cases of
insider trading, as the SEC often would have the courts do.
Indeed, all the nuances of insider trading jurisprudence, in key
areas like the scienter requirement and fiduciary duty requirement
are likely to emanate differently if the prohibition is sought to be
vigorously enforced in other jurisdictions. The difficulty here
stems to an extent from the fact that insider trading prohibition is
not the simple proscription of a single activity, as is piracy for
example. Rather, it has come to be a proscription of an open-
ended series of transactions, connected mainly by the alleged
potential for such transactions to impact the market negatively.
There is a gulf between the act complained of in the Carpenter
case204 (trading with opinions formed privately, sometimes by
using publicly accessible information obtained from corporate
insiders) on the one hand, and the act prosecuted in United States
v. Chestman205 (a broker trading with publicly inaccessible
information whose source was solely and ultimately traceable to a
corporate insider).0 6 This is why its definition is an unappealing
proposition to the SEC, as this will confine it to a single offense or
definite set of offenses.
So, would a foreign court presented with the same facts and
the text of Rule lOb-5 convict the petitioners in the Carpenter case
202 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 6, at 929-31 (noting the distinction between
the two concepts and a short history of manipulation).
203 See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
204 See discussion supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
205 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992).
206 See Carpenter v. United States; United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (1991)
(en banc), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992); supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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either for insider trading or for aiding and abetting? This would
ultimately turn on its conception of the categories of fiduciary
relationships, and its opinion on whether it is empowered to
stretch the rule to the extent inherent in the misappropriation
theory. This is doubtful, given that attaching fiduciary duties to a
person is merely to begin inquiries about to whom the duties are
owed and the circumstances in which they are owed, questions
that may not necessarily be answered by a foreign court in the
same way as an American court. Certainly relevant is also the
more sedate judicial disposition in most of these jurisdictions, a
disposition which does not favor the radical creation or extension
of liabilities and judicial concepts generally, as U.S. courts are
wont to do.
A look at the EEC (European Union) Insider Dealing
Directive207 and its operations shows aspects of the foregoing
problems. The drafters appear to have appreciated the difficulties
of having a rule which is based on fraud, and related fiduciary
notions. Article 2(1) of the directive simply prohibited an insider
in possession of inside information "from taking advantage of that
information with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or
disposing for his own account or for the account of a third party,
either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of the issuer or
issuers to which that information relates. 2 °8  This article also
distinguishes between primary insiders and secondary insiders.
Article 4 restrains the former from tipping while the latter is not so
restrained, though the latter may not trade with the information." 9
Unlike U.S. law, the rule for secondary insiders under the directive
is applicable, irrespective of the legality or otherwise of the means
or source by which they obtain information.20 Because of this, the
whole chain of insiders and tippees is caught, and it is unnecessary
to prove where the leak occurred once a person has inside
information. 21  The key concept of inside information is also
207 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, Council Directive 89/592, art.
1(2), 32 O.J. (L 334/30).
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Warren, supra note 195, at 1069.
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defined.212 The philosophical underpinning of the directive is the
enhancement of the efficiency of the market through eliminating a
practice that potentially is corrosive of confidence in its operation,
as distinct from the enforcement of fiduciary or other duties owed
by management or other market players.
"[T]hrough its prohibitions, the directive is able to circumvent
tedious distinctions between insiders and outsiders, inside
information and market information, the immoral tipper and the
derivative tippee, all based on the fraud and fiduciary duty
rubric.... By eliminating the forced use of criteria underlying
fraud, deception and related fiduciary duty notions, the EC has
produced a directive which has a greater potential effectiveness
on its face than the evolving insider trading prohibitions in the
United States. 213
"[B]y focusing on the possession of inside information rather
than on a breach of fiduciary duty, these definitions are
comprehensive enough to prevent more remote inside traders from
slipping through cracks in the system as they often do in the
United States" 21
4
212 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, Council Directive 89/592, art.
1(1), 32 O.J. (L 334/30) (defining inside information as "information which has not been
made public of a precise nature relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities
or to one or several transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely
to have a significant effect on the price of the transferable security or securities in
question").
213 Warren, supra note 195, at 1056.
214 Standen, supra note 28, at 190-91. An observer may be tempted to ask why the
European Union has chosen to implement a general scheme of insider trading regulation,
if indeed there is a disappearing consensus or no consensus at all on the undesirability of
insider trading as argued earlier in this paper. The answer is that in today's competitive
market every region tries to get as much regulatory leverage as possible in order to
enhance its competitiveness. The regions do so even when it involves the deployment of
legislative placebos by way of insider trading regulations. Accordingly, the EU's
scheme for insider trading regulation is largely aimed at enhancing the formal credibility
of the European market, given that many investors (particularly those from the dominant
U.S. market) still distrust markets where insider trading is rife. One commentator noted:
Seen in the best light, the [insider trading] directive establishes a new moral:
Insider trading is now, for the first time a European sin and, henceforth, a public
wrong for market participants. Seen in the worst light, the directive merely
assists the EC in its promotion of a dangerous imagery of regulation; the
directive's denunciation of insider trading conveys the false impression of a
comprehensively regulated market place. This image, framing the EC's
regulatory system as a paragon of regulatory virtue, recommends the EC's
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Implicit in the approach adopted by the drafters of this
legislation is an acceptance of the limitations of fiduciary based
insider trading jurisprudence, as a means of imposing multi-
jurisdictional insider trading liability. The fiduciary approach is
dispensed with, and a more functional and objective basis is
substituted. This is however, not the end of the matter, as several
elements of the prohibition have had to be defined in the Directive.
What is more, the Directive must be implemented by enabling
statutes in each country of the European Union before it can
become effective. Divergences certainly exist in the definition of
the offense and its constituent elements in each country.215 Will
the SEC be content with a situation in which the same transaction
is successfully prosecuted in one country but not in another due to
inevitable divergences in the definition of the elements of the
offense or due to judicial attitude? Or will it bring pressure to bear
in order to achieve a harmonization of definitions, given that the
transactions involved affect U.S. interests? What if the different
results are a function, not of statutory definition, but of the
interpretive approach of a court and the overall judicial culture of
a jurisdiction? For some judges, insider trading will for long be
something less reprehensible than the legislature intends.2 16 Thus,
judicial attitude will for long remain a major enforcement
problem. But even when judicial attitude in this general sense is
altered, such aspects thereof as form part of established
marketplace to the international investment community and to regulatory
authorities, particularly those in the United States who are under increased
political pressure to accord reciprocal treatment to EC firms.
Warren, supra note 195, at 1040. It is instructive that in many EU countries, even after
implementation of the Insider Dealing directive through national legislation, there has
not been a significant improvement in prosecutions and convictions for insider trading
violations. Concerning the situation in several of these countries, see generally,
INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996).
215 In Germany for example, the Second Financial Markets Promotion Act (FMA)
was passed in 1994 to give effect to the directive. In clarifying the directive's "precise
nature" element of inside information, the FMA distinguishes between insider facts on
the one hand, and analyses on the other. "The narrowly construed wording may provide
an escape hatch for accused insider traders who can successfully claim their inside
information was not factual in nature." Standen, supra note 28, at 203.
216 See Insider Trading in Europe: A Daft Draft, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1989, at 87.
Here, it is stated with reference to insider trading in Germany and France, that "[s]ome
judges still treat insider trading as gentlemanly misunderstanding, rather than a crime."
Warren, supra note 195, at 1069.
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interpretive traditions and procedural approaches will stand
unchanged. Rule lOb-5 or other statutory enactment of the insider
trading prohibition will often be nurtured differently in different
jurisdictions, and this will in many cases militate against the
attainment of the scope of prohibition necessary to achieve the
SEC goal of comprehensively protecting U.S. investors and
interests globally.
IV. Recommendations and Conclusion
A predictable conclusion from the foregoing discussion of the
problems of regulating international insider trading is that the SEC
should discontinue its international crusade against such
transactions and take a restrained view of its jurisdiction, thus
giving room for other countries' regulators to determine the
necessity for, and scope of, insider trading regulation within their
domains. As a corollary to this, any concerted efforts to regulate
the subject globally should only be in the context of a rigorously
negotiated, broad-based, international agreement that seeks to
accommodate the interests and objections of other countries.
However, it would be naive, in the context of the entrenched
institutional interests and strong passions elicited within the
United States by insider trading, to expect that such a radical
prescription would find acceptance within the regulatory
establishment. It is therefore more realistic to seek a middle
course of sorts, that affords U.S. regulators the opportunity of
controlling international insider trading in some circumstances, but
not in others.
In a 1995 piece, a professor and former SEC commissioner
notes the dilemma that globalized markets pose for the SEC: "how
to accommodate its mandate of investor protection and [i] the
growing interest of U.S. investors in diversifying across the globe,
and [ii] the interest of the U.S. financial community in having
foreign issuers use the U.S. capital markets. ,2 " He reaches
conclusions generally consistent with the need for the SEC to
regulate less in the international context, especially through
experimentation with international reciprocity. 218  However, he
nevertheless finds the extra-territorial application of U.S.
217 Longstreth, supra note 29, at 320.
218 Id.
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securities laws excusable, where foreign activities harm U.S.
investors.2t 9  This sort of instinctive inclination towards
extraterritoriality on account of the "interest of U.S. investors" lies
at the center of the regulatory problems with insider trading
discussed in this paper. The fact that in this instance, the
statement issues from an ex-regulator who is otherwise amenable
to reduced extra-territoriality is indicative of the addictive qualities
of this clichd and the psychological disposition that fuels it. From
constant usage, this clich6 has acquired the character of a
mathematical constant, becoming a veritable starting point in
analysis rather than the conclusion that it should ordinarily be.
Yet, in today's constantly evolving world, fast-paced change is the
norm, with little room for fossilized clich6s.
In light of the foregoing, there is a need to analyze the content
of "interests of U.S. investors" in the context of the international
regulation of insider trading. What exactly is the content of that
phrase or idea for purposes of insider trading in the globalized
financial markets? Given the likelihood of a multiplicity of
contents, how best can the several aspects of the "interests of U.S.
investors" be satisfied? Is it even remotely possible that such
interests are better served in the long-term through a redefinition
to make it capable of accommodating the interests of non-U.S.
investors and regulators? Even if not redefined, can it in its current
configuration, be administered in such a way as to accommodate
other interests? Several other similarly relevant questions can be
posed. However, exploring the last question, by seeking ways of
administering U.S. investors' interests in a manner
accommodating of other interests, seems the least onerous of the
possible approaches. Moreover, it holds a good prospect of
establishing that middle course of sorts, first mentioned above,
that affords U.S. regulators the opportunity of controlling
international insider trading in some circumstances, but not in
others. It potentially aligns the competing interests, without going
through the sensitive task of redefining U.S. investors' interests or
questioning the assumptions underlying their current shape, a task
that is likely to be very political in nature. With this in mind at
least two approaches commend themselves for consideration in
relation to international insider trading, and international securities
219 Id. at 336.
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regulation more generally.
A. Nationality of Issuer
This involves an arrangement whereby each country applies
"its insider trading regime to transactions in shares of issuers of its
nationality" only. 220  In effect, even if the insider trading
transaction occurred on a particular country's stock exchange and
involved its citizens, the transaction will not be regulated by that
country if the issuer of the securities involved does not have that
country as its nationality. This is an approach canvassed by
Professor Merrit B. Fox.22'
For this purpose, nationality is not treated as the place of an
issuer's incorporation. Rather, drawing on the continental
European "real seat" doctrine, an issuer is considered a national of
a country when "the largest portion of its shares is held by
residents of that country, and the largest portion of its operations is
conducted there. '222  This test or approach leads to situations
which on the surface appear skewed. The United States would
find that a purchase on the New York Stock Exchange of the
shares of Mercedes Benz AG by an insider with material, non-
public information was not a violation of U.S. insider trading laws,
even if the seller and purchaser were U.S. residents or nationals.
German insider trading laws would apply, Germany being the
country whose residents hold the largest portion of Mercedes Benz
shares, and the place where the company conducts a greater
portion of its operations. Along the same lines, the United States
would find that an insider's purchase on the Frankfurt stock
exchange of General Motors stock was a violation of U.S. insider
trading laws, even if both parties to the transaction were German
nationals or residents.
These results seem skewed, since the application of German
law instead of U.S. law in the first case runs contrary to the
established "investor protection" tradition of U.S. securities
regulation, while application of U.S. law to the second transaction
on the Frankfurt stock exchange appears very intrusive. However,
by focusing on corporate law (rather than securities per se), and by
220 Fox, supra note 122, at 302.
221 id. at 294-95.
222 Id. at 275 n.26.
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exploring the transactions through the prism of the interests served
by insider trading rules of each jurisdiction, we see that the results
are far from being skewed. It is a fact that the purchase of real
estate with insider information is not penalized by the law in the
same way as the purchase of securities, even though the same type
of information is involved. From this, it can be surmised that the
policy behind the law's prohibition of insider trading in securities
is a reinforcement of the general strictures against self-interested
behavior by corporate insiders, rather than reinforcement of any
general notion of fairness in the circumstances. This justifies the
reach of U.S. and German insider trading laws in the above
examples. The underlying policy being the restraint of self-
dealing by insiders and the resultant negative effects on the
corporation, it is quite normal for this to be regulated by German
law for Mercedes Benz, and U.S. law for General Motors. Beyond
the fact of corporate governance issues being ordinarily within the
purview of these jurisdictions for the respective companies, there
is also the very important point that the country of a company's
nationality will often be best positioned to reach the respective
insiders and prosecute them. Thus, their jurisdiction is effective,
which "is an important value in and of itself because it reinforces
the legitimacy of a regulatory regime., 223  The approach
effectively entrusts to the government of the country of a
company's nationality the task of regulating insider trading
affecting the company's insiders, as an adjunct of its corporate
regulatory jurisdiction.
The chief attraction of this approach for purposes of this paper
is that, "by the transactions it assigns to each government, [it]
concentrates the effects of the regime that the government
chooses-whether those effects turn out to be good or bad-on the
residents of the country the government represents.22 4 In essence,
it potentially internalizes any tendencies of the country's regulator
to be unduly aggressive or high-handed. Also related to this is its
likelihood to minimize conflict between countries because only
one country will be entitled to regulate a cross-border insider
trading transaction.
There are, however, some potential setbacks to the approach.
223 Id. at 300.
224 Id. at 299.
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First is the fact that it assumes that even when there is a
multiplicity of countries with potentially conflicting claims to an
interest in regulating a particular insider trading transaction, one of
them will always emerge clearly as the nationality of the issuer.
This is not always the case, especially when dealing with true
multinationals whose operations are evenly laid out in several
countries. Professor Fox's solution is that there are relatively few
such companies today, and that for these the place of incorporation
or simply the seat of their governance (headquarters) should be
used as a default rule. 225 He concedes however that in the long
run, increases in transnational portfolio investments and
transnational direct investments "could render the recommended
approach unworkable," as a large proportion of the world's
production becomes undertaken by firms whose operations are so
structured that "no clear national center of gravity" will be
discernible. 226 "Arrival at this point ... rather than indicating the
need for a new principle to determine the reach of national
regulation, will signal that the entire system of national-level
regulation of corporate law and insider trading will have become
obsolete." 22
7
Another possible point concerning the approach is that it
would require a great deal of cooperation between regulators.
Inability to garner such cooperation will be its undoing. However,
cooperation is an absolute necessity for any form of effective
global regulation of insider trading. It is a common denominator.
Even the SEC in its current largely unilateral approach to
international insider trading regulation needs to elicit the
cooperation of other regulators, sometimes by coercion, in order to
achieve its aim. This therefore does not diminish the appeal of the
approach, as a possible way for a reasoned reciprocal restraint on
extra-territorial extension of insider trading regimes.
B. Portable Reciprocity
The theory of portable reciprocity was developed by
Professors S. Choi and T. Guzman in a recent piece.228 While
225 Id. at 299 n.73.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 302.
228 Choi & Guzman, supra note 48.
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developed with the general field of securities regulation in mind,
the specific needs of insider trading regulation in a global market
place also received attention.
The piece notes the assumption of the current U.S. securities
regulatory regime that Americans are unable to discount for the
loss of the protection provided by U.S. securities laws, and that
U.S. regulation indeed acts as a valuable form of protection.
These assumptions are the standard justifications for extending the
reach of the U.S. regime extraterritorially, to transactions taking
place in other jurisdictions and having some effect on U.S.
markets and investors. Rule lOb-5 is an aspect of the U.S. regime
that is sometimes extended in this way.229 It notes in particular
that the extra-territorial application of Rule lOb-5 to deal with the
increasing internationalization of the securities markets are
"misguided" for several reasons, including the fact that it
potentially leads to a policy subjecting any securities transaction in
the world to U.S. law.23° Choi and Guzman also note the existence
of normal reciprocity as exemplified in the Multijurisdictional
Disclosure System (MJDS) between Canada and the United States,
and propose portable reciprocity as a means of taking this much
further.23'
Portable reciprocity involves an arrangement between a group
of countries, whereby an issuer may select the laws of any of the
participating countries to govern a particular transaction, such as a
stock issue. The law chosen need not be the law of the place of
the transaction or the law of the company's nationality (by
whatever criteria this is defined). 233  This approach effectively
delinks the choice of a capital market from the choice of a
regulatory regime. Thus, choosing to use the U.S. capital markets
would not necessarily mean a choice of U.S. securities law.
Furthermore, an issuer's sale of securities under the regime of a
particular country does not preclude a subsequent issue under the
regime of another country.234 Each issue is so designated and
229 Id. at 905 n.9, 911.
230 Id. at 915.
231 Id. at 907.
232 Id. at 937.
233 Id.
234 Id.
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marked that the regime under which it is issued is apparent. The
regime under which an issue was effected becomes a sort of
personal law attaching to the securities in that issue, and regulating
subsequent transactions therein, including insider trading.
In the context of this paper, the chief advantage of portable
reciprocity stems from the fact that it effectively "rejects territorial
notions of jurisdiction and allows securities market participants to
choose the most appropriate regulatory regime for themselves. By
rejecting territorial-based jurisdiction, portable reciprocity
essentially allows securities market participants to determine the
jurisdictional reach of different countries' regimes" through the
choice they make to use it or ignore it .235 The costs and problems
of the SEC's present approach to global insider trading regulation
will be considerably attenuated by portable reciprocity through the
SEC's recognition of transactions under less stringent rules of
other jurisdictions, which transactions would hitherto have been
the subject of SEC enforcement action if American investors'
interests are implicated. Portable reciprocity has other advantages
such as increased investor choice stemming from the potential
availability of a greater variety of securities.236
A major source of apprehension, however, is the possibility
that portable reciprocity will lead to a race to the bottom between
securities regulators. This is not necessarily so, as Choi and
Guzman show, since each regime should have its own attractions,
and the most lax regime need not necessarily attract the most
patronage. 237 The U.S. regime for instance would be seen as a
quality regime for high quality issues, so that securities to which
such image is essential would naturally seek to be regulated under
that regime. They will not only enjoy a premium on price, but
also the positive signal to the market concerning the quality of the
issue and issuer generally. Those securities and issuers operating
under less strict regimes will have to suffer a discount on their
prices, in order to compensate for their lower quality.238
Portable reciprocity additionally has advantages over the
nationality approach. It is in particular a long-term approach
235 Id. at 921.
236 Id. at 922.
237 Id. at 923-24.
238 Id. at 922-24.
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unlike the nationality approach, which is admittedly mid-term, and
would need to be dropped when the present pattern of global
investment changes to a level where it is difficult to locate a clear
national center of gravity. Therefore, portable reciprocity is the
regulatory approach of the near and far future.
Each of the two approaches described above, even if fully
accepted and implemented, is still but a half-way house, a
compromise that imposes substantial but not complete restraints
on extraterritorial application of insider trading laws. They do not
address fully or eliminate some of the enforcement problems
raised in this paper. Portable reciprocity for instance, even if
adopted, does not define or constrain the enforcement actions and
procedures that may be adopted by the SEC when a Swiss trader in
Switzerland trades with inside information on securities whose
issuer has voluntarily chosen U.S. law.239 Will the SEC take the
Constitution off like a coat in the process of investigating and
punishing such a trader, thus putting fundamental rights in
jeopardy? 240 A sense of restraint and global responsibility is
239 One approach might be for the SEC to ask the Swiss authorities to take
enforcement action on its behalf. The chance of this happening is remote, however,
given the SEC's current mindset on enforcement.
240 Cf. RON CHEPESIUK, HARD TARGET: THE UNITED STATES WAR AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING 78 (1999). Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, criticized
the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 and the removal of its ruler, Manuel Noriega, to the
United States on drug charges. He noted that the "DEA and the FBI take off the [U.S.]
Constitution like a coat when they cross the border . . ." leading to much abuse of
fundamental liberties. Id. It is indeed possible to take much further, a comparison of the
international drug law enforcement activities of the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with the international insider trading
initiatives of the SEC. First, narcotics, like insider trading, is a disproportionately
American problem. America has six percent of the world's population, but consumes
fifty percent of its mind-altering substances. Symposium: Towards a Compassionate and
Cost-Effective Drug Policy: A Forum on the Impact of Drug Policy on the Justice System
and Human Rights, 24 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 315, 323 (1997) [hereinafter Symposium].
Similarly, insider trading is a disproportionately American problem. The fervor
with which American jurisprudence abhors insider trading and the expressive language
with which it is described is unsurpassed. This is evidenced for instance by the
following statement made in 1984 by Senator D'Amato (R-NY): "I concur
wholeheartedly with John Fedders, the Director of the SEC's Division of enforcement,
that insider traders are thieves." Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 1 (1984) (statement
of Sen. D'Amato, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Securities). See Amir Licht,
Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, Ch. 4, 4-61 (1998)
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perhaps ultimately the only constraint on such excesses.
While the foregoing approaches are certainly not complete
solutions, they do indicate that with an open mind better solutions
can be found to global insider trading than the current unilateral
inward-looking approach of the SEC. As globalization proceeds
apace, the concept of a national economy and its regulation will
gradually become empty and frustrating attempts at closing ever-
widening gaps in the national systems. A broader perspective
becomes necessary in defining national interests in a manageable
way, in seeking novel approaches to the management of such
interests, and indeed, in knowing when such interests should be
abandoned or restructured in the context of new realities. The
SEC will have to engage in this process more readily than it
hitherto has done.
(Unpublished SJD dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with Harvard Law
Library). The common result is that when the SEC or the DEA goes after offenders in
foreign lands, or takes other action having extraterritorial effect, such moves are
supported by the feeling within the United States that no sacrifice is too great to stem
these vices. This is, however, counterbalanced by a feeling in foreign lands that this is a
case of the United States putting the burden of its problems on other countries. This is
more true in relation to insider trading, given its apparently weaker normative
foundation. Even more revealing than the foregoing is agency resistance to change that
results largely from the encrustation of secondary objectives and vested interests as a
burden and hindrance on the primary statutory mandates of both the SEC and the DEA.
As already noted, supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text, both the SEC itself and
other constituencies, especially market professionals and securities lawyers, possess
vested interests in continued regulation, leading to a displacement of the public's own
interests. This appears to be even more so in relation to the regulation of narcotics.
There, the vested interests are gargantuan. Drug law enforcement has become a business
and a profession. Worse than the professionals at the SEC, the DEA professionals are
mono-service professionals. If drugs were to suddenly become legalized, they would
likely be displaced professionally, unless substantially retrained and reabsorbed. (The
SEC's professionals on the other hand could still continue with other aspects of
securities regulation, even if insider trading were to be de-proscribed.) The thinking in
some quarters is that the drug enforcement business is so entrenched that getting rid of it
is a major obstacle on the path of fresh and more effective thinking on the narcotics
problem. The major components of what has been referred to as the prison-industrial
complex include unions of prison guards and correction officers as well as private
enterprises involved in the business of imprisonment, some of the latter having enough
financial prospects to merit listings on the stock exchange. See generally, Symposium,
supra note 240.

